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ABSTRACT 
The changing nature of terrorist attacks in the previous decade has cast 
doubt on the commonly accepted constraints on terrorist violence. Claims that 
these constraints are eroding has led to an unstudied assumption that modern 
terrorist groups, and al-Qaeda in particular, are not subject to constituency 
constraints.  Most alarming is the possibility that al-Qaeda, allegedly 
unconcerned with alienating supporters, will attack the United States with 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD).  Yet no detailed study of al-Qaeda’s 
constituency constraints has been undertaken, even though they devote 
considerable effort to win popular support among Muslims. 
This thesis reveals that al-Qaeda seeks the support of a constituency as 
the central pillar of their strategy.  This constituency, contrary to Western 
portrayals, largely does not support indiscriminate killing and would not support a 
WMD attack.  Al-Qaeda is aware of this sentiment, and as a pragmatic group is 
willing to alter their methods to gain supporters.  Consequently, al-Qaeda is not 
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1 
I. INTRODUCTION  
A. AL-QAEDA: UNCONSTRAINED? 
Al-Qaeda has become popular culture’s poster child of what has been 
termed the “new terrorism.”1  Al-Qaeda appears to share all of the necessary 
characteristics of this new breed: religious, if not apocalyptic goals; the 
willingness to inflict mass casualties; and a transnational, networked 
organization.  The obvious corollary of these characteristics is that al-Qaeda is 
free from past constraints on violence, is seeking to acquire and willing to use 
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), and has the organization required to 
execute a devastating attack using these weapons. 
The academic generalizations and political rhetoric about terrorism and 
the WMD threat have overlooked an important fact regarding al-Qaeda’s 
operations: their careful and long-standing efforts to legitimize their actions to the 
wider Muslim community.2  These efforts seem to indicate that al-Qaeda seeks 
some level of approval and support from a constituency -- in this case some 
portion of the world’s 1.3 billion Muslims.  This fact stands in stark contrast to the 
implicit suggestion that al-Qaeda has no constituency to satisfy and is therefore 
free from constraints in carrying out attacks.  If al-Qaeda seeks the support of a 




                                            
1 “New terrorism” is the commonly accepted phrase to represent the characteristics of 
modern terrorism first described by Bruce Hoffman in Terrorist Targeting: Tactics, Trends, and 
Potentialities (Santa Monica: Rand, 1992). 
2 Jonathan B. Tucker and Amy Sands, “An Unlikely Threat.” The Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists (July/August 1999): 46-52.  Tucker and Sands note that in the late 1990s, President 
Clinton and Defense Secretary Cohen both emphasized the threats from unconventional 
weapons in the hands of terrorists.  Two books from this same period conclude that the threat of 
WMD terrorism is growing, but they do not empirically examine any particular group.  Walter 
Lacquer, The New Terrorism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), emphasizes both the 
proliferation of capabilities and terrorist groups as reasons for concern.  Richard Falkenrath, 
Robert Newman, and Bradley Thayer, America’s Achilles Heel (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998), 
acknowledge the scarcity of groups that appear willing to use WMD, but argue that the high 
consequences of a WMD attack merit increased attention to the threat.   
2 
B. PUBLIC OPINION AND POLICY 
The answer to this question should not, by itself, determine the extent to 
which the United States prepares for a terrorist attack utilizing WMD.  Aum 
Shrinrikyo has already demonstrated that some groups are prepared to use 
WMD on a massive scale; prudence dictates at least a minimal effort be made to 
prevent it.  Likewise, advocates of the new terrorism paradigm may be correct in 
raising the alarm about the disturbing characteristics of some terrorist attacks 
that emerged in the last several decades.  However, caution must be used to 
avoid an uncritical association of all new terrorism characteristics with a particular 
terrorist group.  The new terrorism paradigm is a conglomeration of 
characteristics; no group will be associated with all of them.  Ignoring the 
specifics of a particular group can result in generic policy that ignores important 
factors impacting a group’s ability to carry out violence.  For al-Qaeda in 
particular, understanding the factors that may constrain their decision to use 
WMD may lead to a better informed counterterrorism policy.3  If al-Qaeda is 
constrained from using WMD by the sentiments of a constituency, the United 
States should carefully consider how its policies affect this population. 
C. THE CONSTRAINTS ON TERRORIST VIOLENCE 
The understanding of terrorist group restraint was best summarized by 
Brian Jenkins.  In “The Limits of Terror: Constraints on the Escalation of 
Violence,” Jenkins best summed up these limits in the oft repeated phrase, 
“Terrorists want many witnesses, not many dead.”4  Jenkins asserted that in 
addition to the logistical limits of attaining truly catastrophic weapons, terrorists 
                                            
3 John Parachini, “Putting WMD Terrorism into Perspective.”  The Washington Quarterly 26, 
no. 4 (Autumn 2003): 42.  Parachini frames the general policy implications from a failure to 
understand the restraints and disincentives a group has to employing WMD. 
4 Brian Jenkins, “The Limits of Terror: Constraints on the Escalation of Violence,” Harvard 
International Review 17 (Summer 1995): 46.  In this article Jenkins restates this popular phrase, 
which he first coined in 1974.  Some version of this quote surfaces countless times in terrorism 
literature.  This theme of constrained intent appears in Ehud Sprinzak, “The Great Superterrorism 
Scare,” Foreign Policy 112 (Autumn 1998): 113; Tucker and Sands p. 47; David C. Rapoport, 
“Terrorism and Weapons of the Apocalypse,” National Security Studies Quarterly (Summer 
1999): 49; Michael L. Moodie, “The Chemical Weapons Threat,” in Terrorism and 
Counterterrorism, ed. Russell Howard and Reid Sawyer (Connecticut: McGraw-Hill/Dushkin, 
2003), 198; and David Tucker, “What’s New About the New Terrorism and how Dangerous is it?” 
Terrorism and Political Violence 13 (Autumn 2001): 6. 
3 
are constrained by a variety of non-logistical factors.  Limits on terrorist’s 
intentions include organizational, political, and social factors that constrain 
groups from escalating violence beyond an acceptable level.  From an 
organizational standpoint, groups may fear splintering as a result of 
disagreements over conducting attacks resulting in mass casualties.  The 
political landscape may limit escalation in that most groups want only to change 
the system, but may potentially destroy it through their actions.  Finally, social 
limitations can occur when terrorist groups fear that escalating attacks may 
alienate their support base and result in lost sympathy for their cause.5 
Three terrorist events in the 1990s began to shift the thinking about the 
relevance of these limitations.  The 1993 attack on the World Trade Center and 
the 1995 attack on the Oklahoma City federal building illustrated the willingness 
of some terrorists to inflict mass casualties.  Although the World Trade Center 
attack resulted in few casualties, the investigation revealed that the perpetrators 
intended to collapse one tower onto the other, with the potential for casualties 
well beyond any previous attack.6  The Oklahoma City attack made mass 
casualty terrorism on U.S. soil a reality.  Finally, the 1995 Aum Shrinrikyo sarin 
gas attack in the Tokyo subway system brought to the forefront fears of WMD 
attacks, as well as the danger of religious motives. 
These attacks spawned a new debate about the nature of modern 
terrorism, not because of the actual destruction inflicted, but because some of 
the conventional wisdom about the constraints on terrorist violence appeared to 
be violated.  These attacks gave rise to both doomsday rhetoric from policy 
makers and an increased academic critique of the previous notions on the limits 
to terrorist violence.  The use of WMD, the apparent willingness to cause mass 
casualties, and the religious motivations of the perpetrators were all cited as 
harbingers of the terrorism to come.  Instead of appealing to a political 
                                            
5 Jenkins, Limits of Terror, 46. 
6 Bruce Hoffman, “Terrorism and WMD: Some Preliminary Hypothesis,” The Nonproliferation 
Review (Spring/Summer 1997): 50. 
4 
constituency, new terrorists seek only to satisfy God.7  Bruce Hoffman 
summarized this view: “new adversaries, new motivations, and new rationales 
have emerged in the recent years to challenge at least some of the conventional 
wisdom on both terrorists and terrorism.”8  Hoffman argued that the conventional 
wisdom was conceived “decades ago” under different circumstances.  He also 
believed that the old ideas were most wrong when it came to WMDs.9  The 
restraints on both capability and intentions were eroding, and “the particular 
characteristics, justifications and mindsets of religious and quasi-religious – as 
compared with secular – terrorists suggest that religious terrorists will be among 
the most likely of potential categories of non-state perpetrators to use WMD.”10 
The proposal that there was now a “new terrorism” did not go 
unchallenged.  Sprinzak and Rapoport took to task the claim that the new groups 
had managed to shed the constraints of violence, and noted the continued 
existence of considerable limits on both terrorists’ capability and intentions.11  
They did, however, open the door a little more in response to the difficulty in 
gauging religiously motivated groups.  The organizational, political, and social 
constraints were noted, but usually with a degree of uncertainty about the 
efficacy of these factors in controlling violence.12   
After the attacks of September 11, politicians clearly had no incentive to 
discuss the possibility of terrorism having social constraints.  Al-Qaeda’s 
willingness to inflict mass casualties, its reported efforts to attain WMD, and its 
stated intention to use them were enough to convince most politicians and many 
                                            
7 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 196; Paul 
R. Pillar, “The Dimensions of Terrorism and Counterterrorism,”  in Terrorism and 
Counterterrorism, ed. Russell Howard and Reid Sawyer, 30 (Connecticut: McGraw-Hill/Dushkin, 
2003); David Kay, “WMD Terrorism: Hype or Reality,”  in The Terrorism Threat and U.S. 
Government Response: Operational and Organizational Factors, ed. James M. Smith and William 
C. Thomas (Colorado: USAF Institute for National Security Studies, 2001), 73; Steve Simon and 
Daniel Benjamin, “America and the New Terrorism,”  Survival 42 (Spring 2000): 59. 
8 Hoffman Inside Terrorism, 196. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid., 197. 
11 Rapoport, 51; Sprinzak, 113-114. 
12 Moodie, 198; Tucker, 6-7; Pillar, 30-32. 
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academics of the possibility, if not probability, of a future WMD attack.  Arguing 
that the nature of terrorism had indeed changed, Russell Howard echoed Bruce 
Hoffman’s view that there was “nostalgia” for the “old terrorism.”13  Yet some 
academic debate still questions the likelihood of a WMD attack taking place.  
John Gearson illustrates that the supposed move towards mass-casualty 
terrorism is statistically questionable, and that attacks have remained 
purposeful.14  Adam Dolnik notes that most groups develop significant 
constituencies and conduct their terror campaigns with clear strategic 
calculations. He also notes that the more popular a group becomes, the more 
support it attracts, and thus traditional restraints become a greater factor.15   
D. QUESTIONS 
Missing from this academic debate is any detailed study of al-Qaeda as it 
relates to the traditional limits on terrorist violence.  While recent Naval 
Postgraduate theses have critically examined the claim that al-Qaeda is a “new 
terrorist” group, they leave unanswered the question of constituency restraints.16  
Al-Qaeda’s stated intentions to acquire and use WMD are alarming, yet their 
attempts to appeal to a larger audience raise questions about the social limits 
under which it may operate.  This thesis will examine evidence that suggests al-
Qaeda is subject to constituency constraints on violence, and to what extent the 
nature of these constraints could impact al-Qaeda’s decision to conduct a large- 
 
 
                                            
13 Russell D. Howard, “Understanding Al Qaeda’s Application of the New Terrorism – The 
Key to Victory in the Current Campaign.”  in Terrorism and Counterterrorism, ed. Russell Howard 
and Reid Sawyer (Connecticut: McGraw-Hill/Dushkin, 2003), 75. 
14 John Gearson, “The Nature of Modern Terrorism,” In Superterrorism: Policy Responses, 
ed. Lawrence Freedman (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2002), 20. 
15 Adam Dolnik, “All God’s Poisons: Re-Evaluating the Threat of Religious Terrorism with 
Respect to Non-Conventional Weapons,”  in Terrorism and Counterterrorism (Revised and 
Updated), ed. Russell Howard and Reid Sawyer (Connecticut: McGraw-Hill/Dushkin, 2004), 176. 
16 Edwin O. Rueda, “New Terrorism? A Case Study of Al-Qaida and the Lebanese 
Hezbollah”  (masters thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2001); Kleanthis Kyriakidis, “21st 
Century Terrorism: Wrong Diagnosis, Inadequate Remedy”  (masters thesis, Naval Postgraduate 
School, 2005).  Rueda’s thesis attempts to debunk al-Qaeda as a “new terrorist” group, but 
explicitly leaves the question of constituency restraint on WMD use open; see p. 54.  Kyriakidis 
claims al-Qaeda is more likely to use WMD as a “Sampson option” because it has been under 
attack from all sides since 9/11, but does not examine constituent constraints; see p. 40. 
6 
scale attack with WMD.  My hypothesis is that in seeking the support and 
approval of a Muslim base al-Qaeda is constrained from using WMD because 
they fear losing popular support. 
E. ASSUMPTIONS 
1. Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) 
Discussions about the use of WMD often fail to discriminate between 
conventional attacks along the lines of what occurred on September 11, small 
scale WMD events like the Washington D.C. anthrax incidents, and a true large 
scale, city-destroying attack.  Attacks using conventional means, having 
demonstrated their effectiveness, will continue to occur for the foreseeable 
future.  But the stigma associated with the “WMD” label has made distinguishing 
between large and small scale attacks difficult.  For the purpose of this argument, 
small scale or poorly executed attacks are excluded from the WMD category.  
While they may be important from a psychological standpoint, these attacks are 
not likely to have any greater material impact than September 11.  What is in 
need of consideration is the possibility of a truly large, professionally planned and 
executed attack utilizing WMD that results in the destruction of the larger part of 
a city and its inhabitants. 
 A meaningful threshold for damage, from a comparative standpoint, is the 
damage resulting from the September 11 attacks.  While those attacks fall on the 
low end of what a successful WMD attack might achieve, they are useful as a 
starting point for a number of reasons.17  First, the scale of destruction on 
September 11 is a reasonable example of what would occur in a successful but 
small scale WMD attack.  The attacks targeted civilians and the physical damage 
was extensive. 
 Second, using September 11 as a comparative point is useful because we 
can analyze the reactions caused by this violence and extrapolate conclusions 
                                            
17 Nadine Gurr and Benjamin Cole, The New Face of Terrorism (New York: I.B. Tauris, 
2000), 80-82.  The authors summarize potential casualties from successful WMD attacks; 
chemical attacks have the lowest potential deaths, from several hundred to several thousand.  
Successful attacks using biological and nuclear weapons would likely result in at least tens of 
thousands.  Thus, the September 11 attacks represent the low end of expectations for the type of 
attack considered here. 
7 
from it.  In other words, if reaction within the Muslim world to September 11 has 
caused al-Qaeda to restrain itself, then we can expect similar effects from larger 
attacks.  The inaccuracies of this approach do not exaggerate any conclusions, 
but serve to downplay them – because September 11 did not involve WMD and 
thus was free from the associated stigma (while still violating norms against 
killing civilians and the illegitimate use of violence).  The stigma associated with 
WMD should produce greater negative reactions. Thus using reactions to 
conventional violence is a useful basis upon which to build conclusions about al-
Qaeda’s future decisions to use WMD.  This indirect approach supposing future 
reactions to a WMD attack from conventional violence is used throughout this 
thesis. 
2. Al-Qaeda as a Functioning Hierarchy 
This thesis examines if a constituency would influence al-Qaeda’s 
decision to conduct a WMD attack in the United States.  Implicit in this 
examination is the assumption that al-Qaeda still exists with some form of 
hierarchical command structure able to make and communicate strategic 
decisions.  This assumption is not without considerable challenges itself.  There 
is no question that the U.S. effort to oust the Taliban from Afghanistan and 
eliminate al-Qaeda as an effective organization has had a devastating impact on 
both, but the degree of this impact is a matter of debate.  The attacks on trains 
and subways in Madrid and London indicate that local terror groups may be 
carrying out attacks without explicit orders or authorization from any central al-
Qaeda leadership.  The potential links that have emerged are unclear and fail to 
conclusively indicate decisions are being made and communicated from top al-
Qaeda leaders.18  Conversely, al-Qaeda’s number two man, Ayman al-Zawahiri, 
reportedly called off a New York City subway attack involving chemical weapons, 
indicating a degree of tactical control and strategic decision making.19  Senior al-
                                            
18 Jason Burke, Al-Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam.  (New York: I.B. Taurus, 2004): 
272.  Mohammed Khan and Carlota Gall, “Accounts After 2005 London Bombings Point to Al 
Qaeda Role From Pakistan,”  The New York Times, 13 August 2006, 1.6.  Keith Johnson, 
“Arrests in Spain Offer New Insight On Terrorists’ Ties,” The Wall Street Journal, 25 October 
2004, A16. 
19 Al Baker and William K. Rashbaum, “U.S. Feared Cyanide Attack On Subway,” The New 
York Times, 18 June 2006, 1.25. 
8 
Qaeda correspondence to Abu Musab al Zarqawi, al-Qaeda’s leader in Iraq, 
indicates they still attempt to wield control over overall strategic decision 
making.20 
By limiting the discussion to consider only large scale WMD attacks, the 
debate about al-Qaeda’s hierarchical control can be minimized because to 
conduct such an attack, al-Qaeda must posses some degree of hierarchical 
organization.  John Parchini states that, “Achieving catastrophic outcomes with 
unconventional weapons requires a considerable scale of operations.”21  Victor 
Asal and Gary Acherman wrote: 
In order for a group to embark upon a concerted CBRN program, it 
would arguably need to devote substantial resources to the 
acquisition, production, and in some cases testing of their 
weapon…any CBRN activities would need to be supported by an 
efficient logistical backbone, including the ability to transport 
personnel and weapons unmolested as well as a robust 
communications capability.22 
A hierarchical structure is necessary to organize such a complex effort, 
even if the hierarchy is very flat.  If no such organization exists to make the 
decision to employ unconventional weapons, it will also be insufficient to 
organize and conduct an effective large scale WMD attack.  If very little control 
exists, then capability to organize and conduct WMD attack is diminished.  If a 
hierarchical organization is required to present this threat, then the assumption 
that this organization exists is required if the threat is to be taken as a 
potentiality.   
                                             
20 The Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at West Point published two letters captured in 
Iraq from senior al-Qaeda leadership.  The first, published online October 11, 2005 is from al-
Qaeda’s number two man, Ayman al-Zawahiri.  The second letter, which amplifies and confirms 
the first, is from a previously unknown al-Qaeda leader ‘Atiyha.  The CTC assesses ‘Atiyah to be 
a “highly placed al-Qa’ida leader who fought in Algeria in the early 1990s.”  This letter was 
discovered shortly after Zarqawi was killed in June 2006.  These letters will subsequently be 
referenced as the ‘Zawahiri, letter to Zarqawi,’ and the ‘’Atiyah, letter to Zarqawi.’  Both letters are 
available online at http://ctc.usma.edu/harmony.asp. 
21 Parchini, 44. 
22 Victor Asal and Gary A. Ackerman, “Terrorist Organizational Factors and the Pursuit and 
Use of CBRN Terrorism” (paper presented at the International Studies Association meeting, San 
Diego, March 2006), 5-6. 
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F. METHODOLOGY 
 This thesis will be a single case study of al-Qaeda and its constituency.  
The case study will be structured into three parts.  The first part will examine 
evidence suggesting al-Qaeda actively seeks to gain approval from a 
constituency.  The second part will attempt to establish to what extent this 
constituency accepts or rejects both the message and the violence carried out by 
al-Qaeda.  Two categories of the constituent group will be sampled: radical 
Islamic groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah, and the Muslim public in general.  
The final part will search for evidence that al-Qaeda is willing to be pragmatic to 
reach its goals, whether they are aware of negative public sentiment, and if they 
have constrained their violence in reaction to this sentiment. 
1. Establishing a Constituency 
The first step in determining if al-Qaeda is constrained by a constituency is 
determining if al-Qaeda seeks support outside of their organization.  This first 
question will be answered by examining the strategic thought of al-Qaeda, a task 
made simpler by al-Qaeda strategists themselves.  Numerous works have been 
published detailing how al-Qaeda’s leadership intends to achieve its strategic 
goals.  The works of three authors in particular will be examined.  These are 
Ayman al-Zawahiri’s Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner published in December 
2001; Abu Bakr Naji’s The Management of Barbarism published in 2004; and 
Abu Mus’ab al-Suri’s Observations Concerning the Jihadi Experience in Syria. 
2. Measuring Constituent Sentiment 
The potential audience of al-Qaeda will be examined by looking at groups 
one might expect to support their violence and the sentiments of Muslims in 
general towards terror, Osama bin Laden, and the U.S.  In the first case, the 
reactions of groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah to al-Qaeda’s violence will be 
examined, as well as jihadis themselves.  In the second case, polling conducted 
by Zogby International and the Pew Global Attitudes Project will be examined for 




3. Evidence of Constraints 
No conclusions showing that al-Qaeda is constrained can be made 
without providing evidence that al-Qaeda is sensitive to sentiments revealed in 
the previous section and is willing to change their tactics to account for these 
sentiments.   Both direct and indirect evidence of constraint will be examined.  
Direct evidence includes changes in behavior and statements by al-Qaeda’s 
strategists necessitating certain limits to their violence.  Indirect evidence 
includes al-Qaeda communications that illustrate awareness that they are 
violating norms of behavior. 
G. CHAPTER ROAD MAP 
 This thesis will be organized into three chapters, plus an introduction and 
conclusion.  The chapters mirror the methodology identified above.  Chapter II 
will examine how al-Qaeda’s goals and strategy indicate that it seeks a wide 
constituency, and how this constituency may limit al-Qaeda’s violence.  Chapter 
III will describe how this constituency accepts or rejects al-Qaeda and the 
violence it conducts.  Chapter four will analyze if and how al-Qaeda has reacted 
to the Muslim response to both its message and methods.  The reactions will be 
used to illustrate the mutual recognition of norms by al-Qaeda and its 
constituency, and whether these norms indicate that it is unacceptable for al-
Qaeda to use WMD.  The concluding chapter will summarize findings from the 
previous chapters and place them within al-Qaeda’s strategic calculus to answer 
the original question: Will al-Qaeda be constrained from using WMD by their 




II. AL-QAEDA’S SEARCH FOR POPULAR SUPPORT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will establish that al-Qaeda’s overall strategy is driven by its 
attempts to appeal to a constituency.  This strategy is the result of lessons 
learned from past failures to mobilize widespread Muslim support for jihadi 
movements.  The strategy has now evolved to place a premium on winning the 
hearts and minds of Muslims.  It is the primary reason the United States was 
targeted for attack; Zawahiri believed their attacks against a nation that is widely 
disliked in the Muslim world would result in a groundswell of support and action.  
But the dependence on public support also requires pragmatism by terrorist 
groups.  One of the titles examined here, The Management of Barbarism, is an 
implicit acknowledgement that violence is not only a tool to influence public 
opinion, but that violence must be controlled and limited by public opinion.  By 
relying on the Muslim public as their primary means to achieve victory, al-Qaeda 
is subject to constituency constraints on the violence they perpetrate. 
B. ESTABLISHING THE CONSTITUENCY 
The primary reason al-Qaeda turned from targeting the “near enemy” 
(apostate Muslim governments) to the “far enemy” (the United States) was to 
gain support from and mobilize the Muslim masses.  The turn to the far enemy 
was not based on a strategic expectation that attacks by themselves would ever 
be able to defeat the sole remaining superpower.  The shift was the result of a 
pragmatic examination of past failed jihadi campaigns.  This examination 
revealed to radical strategists that a large degree of the past defeats were due to 
the failure of jihadi organizations to gain the support of the population, and this 
lack of support made victory against their enemies impossible.  As the magnitude 
of these failures has become clearer, jihadi strategists have come to embrace the 
battle for public support and sympathy as equal to, if not greater than, the 
physical battle against the enemies of Islamic fundamentalists.  The effects of 
this strategic thinking are evident in many ways.  Jihadis are preoccupied with 
the media and frame themselves as a historical Muslim vanguard.  They hijack 
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hot-button issues of the Muslim community for self-promotion, and use 
specifically Islamic justifications to legitimize their violence.  Thus, the strategic 
thought and actions of radical jihadists confirm the existence of a “terror 
constituency” that is viewed as critical to the success of their struggle. 
1. Old Failures, New Strategy 
The past failure of jihadi movements to gain support of the masses is a 
consistent theme in the writings of jihadi strategists.  Works translated from three 
authors in particular illustrate the realization that the neglect of a credible public 
relations campaign doomed the efforts of radical groups by failing to gain a 
minimum level of support.  The regular appearance of this theme is critical in 
establishing that jihadis depend on gaining popular support: it demonstrates in 
their own words an understanding that the success of their efforts are dependent 
on the support of others - they cannot win a contest against governments alone.  
Ayman al-Zawahiri’s Knight’s Under the Prophet’s Banner clearly states that this 
is the reason behind al-Qaeda’s decision to target the “far enemy,” because that 
is something that he expects the Muslim masses to support.23 
Zawahiri said that one of the lessons learned from his confrontation 
with the Egyptian regime over three decades is that the jihadist 
movement cannot isolate itself from the ummah (the Muslim 
community worldwide) and turn into an elite pitted against authority.  
The jihadist vanguard, he said, must be fully integrated into Muslim 
society’s social fabric and must be attentive to its aspirations and 
concerns.  The implication is that jihadis lost the struggle against 
the near enemy because they had isolated themselves from the 
ummah and failed to mobilize it.24 
 The critique of these failures appears in three pieces of jihadi literature 
recently translated.  The first of these pieces is The Management of Barbarism, a 
work by Abu Bakr Naji published in 2004.  Naji is described as “a rising star in the 
jihadi movement.”25  Like Zawahiri (whose own writings are discussed later), Naji 
notes the failure of past jihadi groups to take the initiative in explaining their                                             
23 Fawaz A. Gerges, The Far Enemy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 25-26. 
24 Ibid., 25. 
25 Jarret M. Brachman and William F. McCants, “Stealing Al-Qai’da’s Playbook,” Studies in 
Conflict and Terrorism (forthcoming), http://www.ctc.usma.edu/Stealing%20Al-
Qai'da's%20Playbook%20--%20CTC.pdf, 8-9. (accessed October 2006). 
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violence.  This allowed governments to gain the upper hand in the ideological 
battle and led to the eventual defeat of the movement in Egypt.26 
 A similar and more detailed critique of failed jihadi efforts appears in Abu 
Mus’ab al-Suri’s Concerning the Jihadi Experience in Syria.  Brachman and 
McCants describe Suri as a “senior al-Qa’ida ideologue,” who has “written his 
way into the intellectual heart of today’s jihadi-Salafi movement.”27  Suri plainly 
states what it takes be a successful revolutionary movement:  
The revolutionary uprising starts always with a small group of 
people who happen to be intent, determined, faithful and willing to 
sacrifice for the sake of the cause, if those revolutionary vanguards 
are able to present, and communicate their vision, demands and 
ambitions in a clear and concise manner…then people will begin to 
rally around them….No matter how big or capable the vanguard 
organization is; the war is waged on behalf of the masses, those 
masses are its source of information, supplies, personnel, and 
refuge….All revolutionary wars that were able to mobilize the 
masses on their behalf were successful.28 
But in Suri’s evaluation, the jihadis in Syria fell far short of their efforts to 
rally the people.  The failure to communicate their message to the population led 
to a lack of understanding and support among the masses.29  This lack of 
popular support resulted in the defeat of the Syrian jihad.30 
 Between Zawahiri’s 2001 Knight’s Under the Prophet’s Banner and his 
captured letter to Zarqawi, al-Qaeda’s number two man displays a remarkable 
sensitivity to the importance of winning public opinion.  Having experienced first-
hand the consequences of jihadi’s failure in Egypt, Zawahiri places the blame for 
their defeat squarely on the lack of popular support.  Zawahiri reveals his 
strategic realization that failure “to mobilize the masses in the effort to overthrow                                             
26 Brachman and McCants, 6. 
27 Ibid., 15. 
28 Abu Mus’ab al-Suri, Observations Concerning the Jihadi Experience in Syria.  This citation 
references document AFGP-2002- 600080 Chap 2 (Actually appearing as the 3rd chapter.  2nd 
page of chapter 2, under “2nd. Recruitment, mobilization, and indoctrination.”  The Combating 
Terrorism Center (CTC) at West Point Harmony database documents are available on line at 
http://www.ctc.usma.edu/harmony_docs.asp.  (October 2006). 
29 Al-Suri. 
30 Brachman and McCants, 17. 
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their corrupt rulers” resulted in the general defeat of local jihadi movements in the 
1990’s.31  This acknowledgement of the necessity for gaining support is also 
evident in his thoughts on the Iraqi jihadi movement.  In a warning not to repeat 
the mistakes of the past, Zawahiri counsels al-Qaeda in Iraq leader Zarqawi that 
“in the absence of public support, the Islamic mujahed movement would be 
crushed in the shadows.”32   It is also significant that recent intercepted 
communications in Iraq indicate that the jihadi insurgency is “vexed by the 
continued loss of popular support.”33 
 Zawahiri’s analysis of past failures has led to an acknowledgement of the 
importance of public opinion in the success of al-Qaeda’s efforts.  As the Muslim 
vanguard, Zawahiri believes they “must make sure to mobilize the widest support 
base possible, and not to confront government authority alone.”34  Thus, the 
success of al-Qaeda depends on the support of the masses.35  These thoughts 
are echoed again in Zawahiri’s letter to Zarqawi: jihadis cannot achieve their 
goals if they are “cut off from public support.”36   
 Most revealing in Zawahiri’s writing is the primacy of the effort to gain 
public support in forming strategy.  Zawahiri reveals that al-Qaeda didn’t develop 
its strategy against the far enemy and then seek support for it; it developed the 
strategy as a direct result of an effort to appeal to and gain the support from the 
Muslim masses.  The primary reason for the emergence of al-Qaeda as a global 
threat to the U.S. is an attempt to enlist as many of the worlds 1.3 billion Muslims 
in the jihadi movement as possible.  Fawaz Gerges details this thought process: 
                                            
31 Gilles Kepel, The War for Muslim Minds.  (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004), 1-
2. 
32 Zawahiri, letter to Zarqawi. 
33 Al-Qa’ida in Iraq Hampered by Bureaucracy and Loss of Sunni Support, Combating 
Terrorism Center at West Point, 20 April 2006.  http://www.ctc.usma.edu/CTC%20--
%20Zarqawi%20Letters%20Analysis.pdf (accessed October 2006). 
34 Kepel, War for Muslim Minds, 96. 
35 Schmuel Bar and Yair Minzili, “The Zawahiri Letter and the Strategy of al-Qaeda,” Current 
Trends in Islamic Ideology 3 (February 16, 2006): 41. 
36 Zawahiri, letter to Zarqawi. 
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…Zawahiri offers an alternative solution: taking the war global 
against Islam’s enemies.  He says that the slogan understood by 
the ummah and to which it responds is waging jihad against Israel 
and the American military presence in the region: “The jihadist 
movement finally assumed leadership of the ummah after it 
adopted the slogan of liberating the ummah of its foreign enemies 
and portrayed it as a battle between Islam and kufr [impiety] and 
kufar [infidels].”37 
 Zawahiri recognized that they needed a compelling reason for the masses 
to accept al-Qaeda as their vanguard.  They attempted to find this motivation by 
tapping into the “anxiety and humiliation” that many Muslims feel.38  Zawahiri’s 
strategic thoughts, revealed through his own words, show that al-Qaeda 
constituted itself as a means to mobilize the Muslim masses.  In other words, al-
Qaeda does not exist to win the battle alone for the benefit of all Muslims; al-
Qaeda exists to mobilize the Muslim masses to win the war that al-Qaeda 
cannot. 
2. The Primacy of the Public Relations Effort 
Though al-Qaeda has managed to conduct spectacular attacks, the 
apparently greater degree of carnage and destruction sought does not mean 
jihadists believe the attacks will, by themselves, bring them victory.  Al-Qaeda 
conducts violence to gain public support from its constituency.  Gilles Kepel’s 
The War for Muslim Minds states this point: “…terrorism on Western territory 
would not distract them from their primary task:  waging a war for the hearts and 
minds of Muslims.  Al-Qaeda’s long-term strategy was to strengthen its grip on 
co-religionists and to enlist them in establishing an ‘Islamic state’ through armed 
struggle.”39  The central role of the ummah to al-Qaeda’s strategy has placed the 
public relations effort at the forefront.  The primacy of the public relations effort is 
a theme repeated by all three jihadi authors previously discussed. 
 In The Management of Barbarism, Naji bases his grand strategy on 
creating an overwhelming propaganda victory through baiting the U.S. to invade 
                                            
37 Gerges, 25-26. 
38 Ibid, 138-139. 
39 Kepel, War for Muslim Minds, 2. 
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the Middle East.  Naji does not concentrate on the physical damage attacks may 
do, but on creating a situation that jihadis can exploit to inflame and mobilize the 
masses: 
This will result in a great propaganda victory for the jihadis because 
the people will 1) be impressed that the jihadis are directly fighting 
a superpower, 2) be outraged over the invasion of a foreign power, 
3) be disabused of the notion that the superpower is invincible the 
longer the war goes on, and, 4) be angry at the proxy governments 
allied with the invading superpower.40 
 Suri also gives propaganda a major role in his vision of a successful jihad.  
Suri believes the propagandists “will play a pivotal role” by “pursuing aggressive 
media campaigns and using technology like satellite television and the Internet to 
communicate the movement’s objectives and justify its use of violence to the 
public.”41   
 Zawahiri’s Knight’s Under the Prophet’s Banner also clearly places the 
propaganda effort at the forefront.  Zawahiri’s writings to this effect are framed by 
the consequences of failed efforts – a result of his experience in Egypt.  Zawahiri 
believes their attacks must “take on exemplary value and be easily decipherable 
by targeted populations capable of identifying with them.”42  If attacks are not 
conducted with a proper consideration of the public reaction, “the Muslim 
vanguard runs the risk of general indifference at the killing of its members, and of 
fighting a battle in which it confronts government authority alone.”43 
 Two key pieces of internal al-Qaeda correspondence, captured in Iraq, 
confirm that al-Qaeda’s leadership continues to be extremely concerned about 
the impact of their violence on the public relations effort.  In a letter captured in 
October 2005, Zawahiri reminds al-Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi 
that the support of the Muslim population in the region is the most powerful 
weapon that he enjoys, then warns him to pursue both political and military action 
                                            
40 Brachman and McCants, 7. 
41 Ibid., 17. 
42 Kepel, War for Muslim Minds, 98. 
43 Ibid. 
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side by side: “I say to you: that we are in a battle, and that more than half of this 
battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media.  And that we are in a media 
battle in a race for the hearts and minds of our Umma."44  In the windfall of 
intelligence material gathered at the scene of Zarqawi’s death in June 2006, a 
similar letter was found both confirming the authenticity of the Zawahiri’s letter 
and echoing its sentiments.45  The letter expresses concern with Zarqawi’s 
“failure to understand al-Qa’ida’s broader strategic objective: attracting mass 
support among the wider Sunni Muslim community.”46  It also “reminds Zarqawi 
that military actions must be subservient to al-Qa’ida’s long-term political 
goals.”47  These letters verify that the leadership of al-Qaeda is still very 
concerned about the impact its violence has on the Muslim community.  It also 
demonstrates the degree to which a diminished organization is attempting to 
exert its control of tactical operations for strategic considerations. 
 These letters, and the writings of the three strategists already discussed 
confirm that senior leaders have reached a consensus on the necessity of 
winning the sentiments and support of the Muslim population.  This strain of 
thought is evident in the deluge of internet, audio, and video messages released 
by bin Laden and Zawahiri.  There are far more media “events” than actual 
attacks, illustrating a measure of preoccupation with propaganda.  In fact, fellow 
jihadis and Taliban were critical of bin Laden for his “obsession” with the media.  
Gerges notes that senior members of both groups expressed protest and alarm 
at bin Laden’s infatuation with his public image.  They felt he “was prepared to 
sacrifice Afghanistan and Mullah Omar at the altar of his public relations 
campaign.”48 
 
                                            
44 Zawahiri, letter to Zarqawi. 
45 Letter Exposes New Leader in Al-Qa’ida High Command.  Combating Terrorism Center at 
West Point, 25 September 29, 2006. http://www.ctc.usma.edu/harmony/CTC-AtiyahLetter.pdf. 
(accessed October 2006). 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Gerges, 197. 
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C. CONCLUSION 
The writings of senior jihadi strategists refute any possibility that al-Qaeda 
is committing terror acts solely for terror’s sake.  Al-Qaeda is in the midst of a 
global strategy to mobilize support from the Muslim ummah.  Al-Qaeda places 
the public relations effort at the center of their strategy to achieve this goal.  This 
strategy was arrived at after a careful examination of past jihadi failures to 
nationalist governments.  This examination revealed that the defeats were 
primarily due to the failure to garner support among the population at large.  
Targeting the U.S. was viewed as a possible method to unite the Muslim public 
behind al-Qaeda.  This shift in strategy was not accompanied by any expectation 
of outright military victory, but was fundamentally an effort to mobilize mass 
support against a common enemy; mobilization of the masses is the central 
theme of al-Qaeda’s strategy.  Recent correspondence between key al-Qaeda 
members confirms that this strategy remains as important now as ever.  Al-










III. THE CONSTITUENCY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Muslim opinion matters because al-Qaeda cares about their acceptance 
within the greater Muslim community.  As demonstrated in the preceding chapter, 
mobilizing the ummah is central to this strategy – for al-Qaeda, success or failure 
lies with Muslim sentiment.  This chapter examines Muslim sentiments toward al-
Qaeda in two ways.  First, the jihadi and fundamentalist response post 
September 11 is examined to ascertain how these groups - who would be 
expected to have sympathies with al-Qaeda - responded to al-Qaeda’s attacks.  
Second, public opinion survey from Zogby International and the Pew Research 
Center are used to analyze if al-Qaeda enjoys widespread support and if 
indiscriminate attacks against civilians might be widely tolerated.  Before 
examining these two facets of Muslim opinion, the context in which Muslims 
judge violence must be discussed.   
B. CONTEXT: LEGITIMATE VIOLENCE IN ISLAM 
From its earliest days, Islam has contended with the same problems of 
warfare that have confronted Western civilization.  Justifying both the causes of 
and methods in war have consumed scholars and theologians for centuries.  
Islam’s treatment of these subjects date back to the prophet Mohammed’s 
earliest days and have gone through many different revisions and interpretations 
as the history of the Muslim world unfolded.    The justifications used by al-Qaeda 
are important because they attempt to establish legitimacy for action within an 
Islamic context; that is, they attempt to justify their actions through religious 
interpretation.  Al-Qaeda’s interpretations represent an extreme development of 
this evolving body of thought.  While their arguments are constructed within an 
Islamic framework, the format is similar to Western traditions: justifications for 




In the most general sense, terrorism is no more accepted within Islamic 
culture as they are within Western culture:  
Irregular warfare and terrorism, as those terms are commonly 
understood, are almost uniformly condemned in Islamic literature, 
both classical and contemporary.  Yet both seem to figure highly in 
contemporary developments in the Islamic world.49 
Tamara Son brings up a critical point: why does terrorism appear to be a 
fixture of the Muslim world?  It is essential to understand that, just as Western 
terrorist groups developed their own twisted justifications for violence, so have 
Islamic groups.  But just as in the West, Muslims do not generally accept 
extremist justification without question; they are weighed for their merit in relation 
to the established traditions of Islam.  Just as Western groups express their 
justifications through ideas associated with Western development, Islamic groups 
justify their violence in an Islamic context. 
1. Legitimate War: Defensive Jihad 
Osama bin-Laden has been very clear in making a case for attacks 
against the West: Islam and Muslims are under attack from the West, thus 
Muslims are compelled to engage in a defensive jihad.  The concept of jihad 
takes on many meaning within Islam, and the specific type of jihad called for 
matters in determining the degree of legitimacy.  In other words, some forms and 
interpretations of jihad are more accepted than others.   
Jihad is a complicated concept with a rich history and no agreed upon 
definition.  John Esposito writes that  
If you were watching a television special on jihad, with four Muslim 
speakers, you might well hear four different responses to the 
question: ‘What is jihad?’  One might say that jihad is striving to 
lead a good Muslim life, praying and fasting regularly, being an 
attentive spouse and parent.   Another might identify jihad as 
working hard to spread the message of Islam.  For a third, it might 
be supporting the struggle of oppressed Muslim peoples in 
Palestine, Kashmir, Chechnya, or Kosovo.  And for the final  
                                            
49 Tamara Son, “Irregular Warfare and Terrorism in Islam: Asking the Right Questions,” in 
Cross, Crescent, and Sword, eds. James Turner Johnson and John Kelsay, (New York: 
Greenwood Press, 1990), 129. 
21 
speaker, as for Osama bin Laden, jihad could mean working to 
overthrow governments in the Muslim world and attacking 
America.50 
Bin Laden’s declaration of jihad, first published in October 1996, calls on 
Muslims to engage in a defensive jihad.51  By calling for a defensive jihad, bin 
Laden relies on the earliest authorization for violence in the Koran, stemming 
from the time when Mohammed and his community in Medina came under 
attack.52  The legitimacy of violent action in defense of the Muslim community is 
a generally accepted concept.  Thus, if bin Laden’s argument that the West is 
attacking Islam is considered credible, then engaging in violence against the 
West in a defensive jihad is not only permissible, but compelled.53 
Bin Laden presents what can be, through many Muslim’s eyes, a credible 
argument that Islam is under attack from the West.  In his Declaration of Jihad, 
he presents a laundry list of grievances: 
It is no secret to you, my brothers, that the people of Islam have 
been afflicted with oppression, hostility, and injustice by the Judeo-
Christian alliance and its supporters.  This shows our enemies’ 
belief that Muslim blood is the cheapest and that their property and 
wealth merely loot.  Your blood has been spilt in Palestine and Iraq, 
and the horrific image of the massacre in Qana in Lebanon are still 
fresh in people’s minds.  The massacres that have taken place in 
Tajikistan, Burma, Kashmir, Assam, the Philippines, Fatani, 
Ogaden, Somalia, Eritrea, Chechnya, and Bosnia-Herzegovina 
send shivers down our spines and stirrup our passions.  All this has 
happened before the eyes and ears of the world, but the blatant 
imperial arrogance of America, under the cover of the immoral 
United Nations, has prevented the dispossessed from arming 
themselves.54 
                                            
50 John L. Esposito, Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2002), 26. 
51 Osama bin Laden, Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama bin Laden, Bruce 
Lawrence, ed., translated by James Howarth (New York: Verso, 2005), 23. 
52 Abdulaziz A. Sachedina, “The Development of Jihad in Islamic Revelation and History,” in 
Cross, Crescent, and Sword, James Turner Johnson and John Kelsay, eds.  (New York: 
Greenwood Press, 1990), 39. 
53 Gilles Kepel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2002), 146.  
The compellence of defensive jihad was emphasized by Osama bin Laden’s mentor, Abdallah 
Azzam, during the Afghan war against the Soviets.  
54 Bin Laden, Messages to the World, 25. 
22 
 Esposito notes that “many Muslims today believe that the conditions of 
their world require a jihad.”55  The weakness of Muslim governments and 
economies in relation to the West, the predominance of Western culture, and 
Western complicity in supporting oppressive regimes create a desire to restore 
“Muslim power” through a “return to Islam.”56  Thus, bin Laden’s call for a 
defensive jihad at least holds an attraction in its idea, and resonates with 
Muslims who are displeased with the current state of affairs in the Muslim world.   
The logical extension is that for many Muslims, justification for violence appears, 
at a minimum, plausible.  However, the manifestation of this defensive jihad is 
questionable, because “instead of being defensive, the global jihad operates 
offensively outside the area which would normally be construed as the theater of 
war in which the legitimate defense of Islamic lands against outside aggression 
would occur (for example, Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan).”57  Attacking civilians in 
their homeland does not match the common conception of a defensive jihad.  So 
that while Muslims may be sympathetic towards the view that Islam is under 
attack by the West, the nature of al-Qaeda’s actions are difficult to support in the 
tradition of a defensive jihad.   
2. Proportionality and Discrimination 
Just war theory as it pertains to the practice of war is defined by two 
principles: proportionality and discrimination.58  While “one should not force a 
comparison between the Islamic and Western traditions,” each shows a “moral 
concern that the just and the unjust not be equally subject to the damage of 
war.”59  Plainly put, each tradition has sought to clarify who may be attacked in 
war and what methods are permissible.  In this case, al-Qaeda has a difficult task 
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in satisfying Islamic criteria for both discrimination and proportionality.  In fact, al 
Qaeda simply rejects the classic “regulations regarding the goals and means of 
valid jihad (that violence must be proportional and that only the necessary 
amount of force should be used to repel the enemy), that innocent civilians 
should not be targeted, and that jihad must be declared by the ruler or head of 
state.”60 Since no classic justification for al-Qaeda’s mass killing of civilians exist, 
they rely on their own questionable interpretations.  Bin Laden’s letter to 
Americans contains an exhaustive list of grievances which can be condensed 
into the following logic.  First, as Muslims have been killed by the millions, it is 
just for Muslims to kill Americans by the millions.  Second, since the U.S. is a 
democracy, the people are responsible for their government, and thus may be 
targeted.61  Essentially the argument is based on reciprocity and distributed 
responsibility. 
Bin Laden’s explanations are aided by how Islam categorizes who may be 
killed.  Instead of categorizing people into combatants and non-combatants as in 
the Western tradition, Islam distinguishes between those “who should be killed; 
who may be saved (by discretion) and who must be spared…This distinction 
leaves a great deal of ambiguity regarding various categories.”62  However, John 
Kelsay states that bin Laden distorts “Islamic tradition further than it can go 
without being broken, particularly in the areas of proportionality and the killing of 
innocent people: the second contravenes the Qur’anic command in Q.5:32, 
which indicates that if anyone kills another unjustly, it is as though he or she 
killed the entire  world.”63  The preponderance of text in the Koran   
and hadith contradict al-Qaeda’s  justifications.64 
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Closely associated with the debate concerning these Jus in Bello 
arguments is the question of WMD use by al-Qaeda.  There is no long-standing 
Islamic jurisprudence by which to justify the use of WMD, but the subject has 
received attention in the recent past: 
Justification and acquisition and possible use of nuclear weapons 
has been treated in a number of fatwas for over a decade.  The 
deliberations on this subject distinguish between obtaining nuclear 
weapons and actually using them.  The prevailing argument is that 
as long as nuclear weapons are held by the ‘enemies’ of the 
Muslims (e.g. the United States, Israel) or any other nation at all, it 
is the Islamic duty of all Muslim countries to acquire such 
weapons…The aim of having these weapons is, first and foremost, 
deterrence; to ‘awaken fear in the land of kufr.’65 
Bin Laden’s thoughts on nuclear weapons mirror those above.  In a 
December 1998 interview, he stated that it is a duty of Muslims to acquire 
nuclear weapons, praising Pakistan for their successful effort to do so.66  Three 
years later bin Laden claimed to be in possession of nuclear weapons, but that 
they were for the deterrence of the West.67  An important point is that both the 
arguments cited above and bin Laden’s own statements the use off WMD would 
presumably occur only after a similar attack on Muslims. 
A significant point of departure from these justifications occurred in 2003.  
Saudi Sheikh Naser bin Hamad al-Fahd released a fatwa claiming “that those 
countries that lead the campaign against the use of WMD – the United States 
and the United Kingdom – have already used WMD in the past against their 
enemies, not to mention that they, plus ‘the Jews,’ posses these weapons.”68  Al-
Fahd legitimizes WMD use through vague references from the Hadith.69  He also 
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attempts to deal with the problem of discrimination: that Muslims and children are 
likely to be killed in a nuclear attack.  His fatwa declares that “use of such 
weapons against the United States in obligatory.  The basic justification is 
reciprocity; the behavior of the United States against the Muslims is such that it 
warrants use of weapons of mass destruction.”70  However, al-Fahd recanted 
most of his controversial fatwas in 2003, several months after his arrest in Saudi 
Arabia.  Aside from this fatwa, Reuven Paz found that “Islamic scholars, clerics, 
intellectuals, and even most ordinary Islamist extremists seem to refrain from 
supporting the use of WMD by Islamist groups, fearing the consequences of such 
use for the entire Muslim world.”71 
The various arguments presented by al-Qaeda must be judged against the 
traditional Islamic interpretations of what constitutes legitimate war and legitimate 
violence.  The greater Muslim community must assess for itself whether these 
arguments stand up to Islamic tradition, a review of these arguments 
demonstrates that while Muslims may have grievances against the West, there 
are serious flaws in the explanations that al-Qaeda puts forward.  Al-Qaeda may 
share the same grievances with a majority of Muslims, but a majority of Muslims 
may not advocate the tactics pursued by al-Qaeda.  While it may be understood 
that Muslims view their culture and religion under some form of attack from the 
West, the nature of al-Qaeda’s violence put it outside of the traditions of 
defensive jihad.  Al-Qaeda’s justification for killing civilians stands in stark 
contrast to the preponderance of Islamic religious texts.  Simply put, the 
indiscriminate killing of civilians is clearly taboo according to the earliest traditions 
of Mohammed.  The prohibition on indiscriminate killing places serious obstacles 
in the path to the legitimization of WMD use. 
One justification that warrants careful attention is reciprocity.  The theme 
of reciprocity runs through both the justification used to kill civilians and for the 
potential use of WMD.  Within a population that feels itself under attack and the 
victim of unjust violence, reciprocity would provide a powerful reason to engage 
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in violence that would traditionally be frowned upon.  There is likely a point at 
which Muslims may indeed decide that although they dislike indiscriminate killing 
of civilians, the need for some level of reciprocity may help justify it.  This would 
represent a dangerous turning point in accepting greater levels of violence, like 
the use of WMD, against civilians. 
C. JIHADIS AND FUNDAMENTALISTS REACT 
As noted in the previous section, al-Qaeda’s justifications for violence are 
a tough sell for the larger Muslim community.  In fact, even those groups that 
might be expected to support al-Qaeda’s violence have reacted in a negative 
manner.  After September 11, a variety of groups have issued denunciations of 
al-Qaeda and its attacks.  Included in these groups are organizations historically 
at odds with the West (such as Hezbollah and Hamas), practitioners of suicide 
terrorism, and labeled as terrorist organizations by the United States.  It is 
significant that these groups, traditionally opposed to Westerners (and in the 
case of Hezbollah, responsible for attacks against Westerners) would reject al-
Qaeda’s attacks.  The resistance takes two forms.  First, there is a refutation of 
al-Qaeda’s attempts to justify the attacks through religious interpretation.  
Second - and likely more important for these groups - is a pragmatic reaction 
based on the fear of retribution from the West towards all Islamic fundamentalist 
groups. 
1. Rejecting Al-Qaeda’s Religious Justification 
Al-Qaeda faces significant hurdles in justifying its indiscriminate violence 
because their arguments have implications that concern more than just the 
legitimization of violence, but of who has the authority to interpret Islam.  
Analyzing al-Qaeda’s justification for September 11, Wiktorowicz and Kaltner 
found that: 
The debate over the conditions for permissible violence is therefore 
more than merely a conflict over ideas; it is a struggle over sacred 
authority – the right to interpret Islam on behalf of the Muslim 
community.  As studies of persuasion and framing have noted, the 
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impact of an argument is determined not only by its resonance…but 
by the credibility of the articulator as well.72   
In this respect, al-Qaeda and its defenders face an uphill battle in 
convincing others to accept their argument.  First, al-Qaeda’s calls for jihad are 
questionable because, “Even in the language of those who assert Muslims’ 
fundamental right to physical jihad, historical precedents suggest that resort to 
force requires authorization from some higher authority.”73  Only by their own 
claims does al-Qaeda possess this authority, because they do not possess 
widespread religious legitimacy.  “The jihadi scholars who nurture al-Qaeda and 
provide religious cover for acts of violence suffer from a ‘reputation deficit.’”74  Al-
Qaeda’s lack of legitimacy within the greater Muslim world seriously detracts 
from their ability to convince their coreligionists that indiscriminate attacks against 
Western civilians are just: 
Bin Laden and Zawahiri faced a difficult battle in their efforts to 
incite a large pool of recruits to come to their defense because they 
lacked legitimacy and a credible religious cover.  Equally important, 
they possessed no social base of support outside of Saudi Arabia, 
Yemen, and, to a much smaller extent, Pakistan, from which they 
drew most of their foot soldiers.75 
The attempt by al-Qaeda to usurp religious authority is not well received.  
Far from being accepted as a legitimate voice of Islamic authority, al-Qaeda’s 
arguments are largely rejected by even the most anti-Western of groups.  These 
include Al-Jama’a al-Islamiya, “the largest jihadist organization in the Arab 
world”, Hamas, and Hezbollah.76  These groups issued various denunciations 
following the September 11 attacks.  One of the most prominent rejections, 
signed by 46 leaders of Islamic movements, was published on September 14: 
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The undersigned, leaders of Islamic movements, are horrified by 
the events of Tuesday 11 September 2001 in the United States, 
which resulted in massive killing, destruction and attack on innocent 
lives.  We express our deepest sympathies and sorrow.  We 
condemn, in the strongest terms, the incidents, which are against 
all human and Islamic norms.  This is grounded in the Noble Laws 
of Islam, which forbid all forms of attacks on innocents.77 
What is striking in many of these condemnations, especially given 
widespread Western perceptions that these groups are indiscriminate killers, is 
the assertion that al-Qaeda’s attacks violate Islamic law by targeting civilians.   
Hassan al-Turabi (once bin Laden’s host in Sudan), numerous Al-Jama’a al-
Islamiya authors, and Hezbollah spiritual leader Sayyed Mohammed Hussein 
Fadlallah have all clearly condemned the civilian deaths caused by al-Qaeda as 
wrong and contrary to Islamic law.78  Al-Qaeda may have expected the same 
legitimacy given to Palestinian suicide bombers to be applied to their attacks, but 
this was not the case.79  The crucial point is that even the most radical groups 
draw a critical distinction between what was regarded as legitimate and 
illegitimate targets.    Gilles Kepel notes that:  
Luminaries of “moderate” Islamism, such as the TV preacher Yusuf 
al-Qaradawi (and Egyptian Sheikh from Qatar who hosts the most 
popular religious talk show on Al Jazeera), condemned the 
hijackings.  The anti-Israeli suicide attacks of the Palestinians could 
be justified as martyrdom, he said, since they were part of a 
defensive jihad aimed at reclaiming Palestinian Islamic land that 
had been usurped by the Jews.  Furthermore, Israeli civilian victims 
in restaurants and on buses, women included, were soldiers 
temporarily out of uniform, since in Israel every Jewish citizen is 
either a conscript or a reservist.  Thus, Palestinian bombers were 
“martyrs” in a just war, not “suicides.”  But the sheikh condemned 
the September 11 hijackers as suicides rather than martyrs 
because, contrary to Muslim teaching, they had unduly taken the 
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Qaradawi, was that America is not a legitimate target of defensive 
jihad, and therefore martyrdom in a fight against the United States 
on its soil is not possible.80 
The discrimination being made is crucial to understanding the importance 
of religious legitimacy to fundamentalist groups.  Fundamentalists carefully 
construct their arguments to fit Islamic law; the weakness of al-Qaeda’s religious 
legitimacy and their arguments justifying indiscriminate killings corrode the ability 
of other organizations to maintain their own legitimacy.  If unbridled murder is 
permitted under Islamic law, why have Hamas and Hezbollah so carefully 
constructed their arguments?  Accepting al-Qaeda’s interpretation of what is 
permissible would be a tacit admission that Hamas and Hezbollah’s justifications 
for killing Israelis are little more than window dressing for terrorism.  The dilution 
of their existing legitimacy within the Muslim world is unacceptable to most 
fundamentalist organizations. 
It must be remembered that the critics of al-Qaeda within the 
fundamentalist and jihadist world are solidly anti-Western and highly critical of 
United States’ policies, yet they do not hesitate to reject the killing of civilians, 
even if they are Americans, because it violates their religious beliefs.  This is 
sometimes lost in the Western media portrayal of Muslim reactions to September 
11, because “many of these condemnations were blunted by concomitant 
criticism of American foreign policy as the primary catalyst for al-Qaeda’s war.”81  
But the accompanying criticism of the United States should be seen as further 
proof these groups soundly reject al-Qaeda; although al-Qaeda has struck 
against a common enemy, the violation of Islamic norms is too great to sanction. 
Perhaps the best example of this attitude comes from Hezbollah’s spiritual 
leader.  Prior to September 11, Hezbollah was responsible for more American 
deaths than any other terrorist group.  Yet Sayyed Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah 
“challenged Al Qaeda’s claim that its attacks on the United States could be 
religiously sanctioned.”82  Fawaz Gerges writes that Fadallah’s “debunking of bin 
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Laden and Zawahiri’s notion of transnationalized jihad” is important “because he 
is one of the most prominent radical clerics opposed to American foreign policy, 
and he is highly respected across the broad spectrum of Sunni and Shiite 
Muslims.”83  Gerges writes that the implications of this rejection by a Muslim 
leader of Fadallah’s stature are overwhelmingly negative for al-Qaeda.  He asks, 
“If Al Qaeda cannot co-opt this constituency, who can it co-opt?”84 
An examination of Islamic fundamentalists’ rejection of al-Qaeda’s 
justification for violence clearly shows that bin Laden and Zawahiri have failed in 
their attempts to convince even the most extreme groups of the legitimacy of 
their methods.  Fundamentalist groups share al-Qaeda’s hatred for the West, and 
the United States in particular; however, this has not translated into a sanctioning 
of indiscriminate violence against Americans.  Quite to the contrary, the majority 
of these groups have come out solidly against al-Qaeda’s indiscriminate attacks 
against civilians as contrary to Islamic law.  Al-Qaeda enjoys no legitimacy, and 
certainly no following, in this respect.  Since the jihadi community has rejected al-
Qaeda’s violence thus far, they could not be expected to sanction the use of 
WMD against America. 
2. Pragmatic Fear 
Aside from the theological rejection of al-Qaeda’s violence, radical 
fundamentalist and jihadi groups have another strong motivation to reject al-
Qaeda: fear of Western retribution.  Montasser al-Zayyat, in The Road to al-
Qaeda, writes, “Islamists across the globe were adversely affected by the 
September 11 attacks on the United States.  Even Islamic movements that did 
not target the United States are paying the price for this folly.”85  Al-Zayyat, an 
Egyptian human rights lawyer, is a dedicated Islamist and no friend to the United 
States.  He explains that even though the United States should be resisted by all 
Islamists, the methods used matter.  He criticizes al-Qaeda’s September 11 
attacks as failing to account for their impact on the Islamists’ movement: “Bin 
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Laden’s desire to take revenge heedless of the American and international 
response, and its effect on the future of the Islamic movements in the world, has 
given the Americans and other governments the power to destroy the Islamists 
before our eyes.”86  Al-Zayyat’s sentiments reflect a “utilitarian and pragmatic” 
critique of al-Qaeda that worries about retribution from the sole remaining super-
power. 87 
Fawaz Gerges devotes a major portion of The Far Enemy to explaining 
the reaction of jihadists and fundamentalists to al-Qaeda’s attacks.88  The main 
jihadist groups accused al-Qaeda of “endangering the very survival of their 
movement.” 89  He writes that “more than a dozen books, memoirs, and diaries 
written by leading jihadis, some of whom have played critical roles in the jihadist 
movement, have presented a devastatingly comprehensive critique of Al 
Qaeda…These critiques are important because it comes from within the 
movement , not from outside it.”90  Instead of uniting the Muslim jihadi movement 
behind them, the “non-al-Qaeda jihadis in general did not heed bin Laden and 
Zawahiri’s call and join the fight against the United States. ”91  Instead, Gerges 
notes that Zayyat blames al-Qaeda for unifying the world against the 
“fundamentalist current” instead of the other way around.92  Gerges claims he 
has “not heard a single former jihadi praise Al Qaeda or support its tactics, 
although many think that the United States exaggerates the network’s power and 
reach for cynical foreign policy reasons.”93  Summarizing jihadi reaction, Gerges 
says: 
In a nutshell, the core of the jihadis’ critique is a direct assault on 
what the religious nationalists view as the short-sidedness and 
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colossal miscalculations of bin Laden and Zawahiri.  Although these 
veteran militants are highly critical of America and its foreign 
policies, they say that killing American civilians has proved to be 
disastrous for the Islamist and jihadist movements, and for the 
ummah as well.94 
Even some of bin Laden’s inner circle have criticized the decision to attack 
America.  Abu al-Waid al-Marsi, a key Arab in the Afghan war, published a 
scathing critique of bin Laden.  It “shows restiveness and bitterness among Al 
Qaeda’s top-echelon leadership after suffering crippling blows since September 
11.”95  Instead or aligning jihadis with them, al-Qaeda’s violence oriented those 
groups against them.  Bar and Minzili share Gerges’ assessment of jihadi 
reaction to al-Qaeda: 
The older generation of al-Qaeda linked salafi ulama is clearly 
growing uneasy.  Included in this group are Abu Basir al-Tartusi, 
who took a stand against the London bombing on the basis of his 
interpretation of Islamic law on jihad; Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, 
who criticized Zarqawi, his erstwhile disciple, in a public statement 
on the same basis; and Mohammed al-Masari, one of the fathers of 
the Saudi reform movement in London.  These scholars hold 
undeniable salafi-jihadi credentials and are close to Zawahiri 
ideologically and organizationally.96 
Again, Gerges asks, “If jihadis do not take Al Qaeda’s bait, what 
constituencies would?” 97 
As one might expect, the lack of support for al-Qaeda’s attacks displayed 
by jihadi groups was echoed by more moderate leaders as well.  Gerges writes 
that “like former jihadis, leading mainstream Islamists – Muslim Brothers, 
independents, and clerics – condemned Al Qaeda’s attacks on the United States 
as harmful to Islam and Muslims, not just to Americans.”98  The religious 
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establishment, whose authority was challenged by al-Qaeda’s attempt to rewrite 
what constituted just violence, similarly turned away.99 
Did massive, indiscriminate violence against the United States reward al-
Qaeda with a widespread following and mass support?  No.  “Al Qaeda’s grand 
failure lay in its inability to tap into the natural base of tens of thousands of like-
minded jihadis – religious nationalists – who live throughout the Muslim 
landscape.”100  Al-Qaeda’s decision to strike the United States instead showed 
that “the Al Qaeda chiefs, not Islamic Group leaders, are swimming against the 
current of the times and the dominant trend within the jihadist movement.”101  
Based on the reactions to September 11, Al-Qaeda can not expect to achieve 
their goals through similar or larger attacks. 
Examining reactions to September 11 reveals two crucial factors that have 
shaped the response.  First, legitimacy within the jihadi world matters.  Al-
Qaeda’s lack of religious authority coupled with its weak arguments for 
indiscriminate killing has been met with sound rejection by its peers.  A second 
important factor in the reaction to al-Qaeda is fear of retribution from the West.  
The pragmatic criticisms leveled at al-Qaeda suggest that Western diplomatic, 
law enforcement, and military power are widely feared within the fundamentalist 
community.  This fear of reprisal has not only deterred groups from supporting al-
Qaeda, but resulted in widespread denunciations of their activities and ideology.  
These rebuttals came despite the fact that they originate from groups that 
embody the very deepest of hatred for U.S. foreign policy.  The failure to gain 
religious legitimacy coupled with fundamentalists’ fear of an overwhelming 
response has resulted in the majority of fundamentalist groups turning away from 
al-Qaeda.  Bin Laden and Zawahiri’s failure to unite Islamic extremists behind 
them has made al-Qaeda the “poor cousins of the jihadist family.”102   
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If al-Qaeda is to find support for a WMD attack within the Muslim world, it 
will not be from their fellow jihadis or fundamentalists.  Judging from their 
reactions since September 11, these groups will not sanction such an attack 
because there is not support for higher levels of indiscriminate killing, and they 
fear for the very existence of their movement in the face of what would be an 
overwhelming response by the United States and its allies. 
D. THE MUSLIM MASSES 
If fellow jihadists and fundamentalists groups have not answered al-
Qaeda’s call to jihad, bin Laden and Zawahiri’s hopes lie with the greater Muslim 
community.  Even if al-Qaeda had managed to unify the fundamentalist 
community behind them, the greater constituency is still important: 
It is important to understand terrorists’ other target audience – the 
aggrieved populations that they purport to represent.  This latter 
group, not to be confused with terrorists’ actual cadres, extends to 
a broader, less radicalized population that has the power to confer 
a degree of legitimacy on the terrorists simply by responding 
positively to their tactics.103 
In the case of al-Qaeda, we must attempt to gauge the degree of 
legitimacy they have achieved within the Muslim community, and whether this 
community accepts the indiscriminate killing of civilians that could lead al-Qaeda 
to believe a future WMD attack could be acceptable, if not advantageous to its 
strategic goals. 
Measuring the sentiments of a diverse group of people numbering over 
one billion worldwide is a complicated task. The polls examined here, although 
they represent the best public opinion data available, can hardly account for the 
complexity of the Muslim population; they can offer only the broadest of 
generalizations. Polling has not covered all Muslim countries; the sparse data 
collected in both Egypt and Saudi Arabia detract significantly from the overall 
results.  Furthermore, a Pew analysis found that the states themselves were a 
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major factor in determining attitudes on support for terror.104  These omissions 
are significant because opinions do differ considerably between Muslim states. 
 Survey data represents mostly indirect evidence related to answering the 
questions central to this thesis.  No comprehensive surveys have been done 
asking if Muslims felt the September 11 attacks were justified, or if they would 
support a WMD attack on the United States itself.  However, there are several 
key indicators of support for terror: 
• Support for suicide attacks against civilians 
• Support for attacks against Israelis 
• Support for attacks against Americans and Westerners in Iraq 
• Favorability/confidence ratings of bin Laden 
 Lack of pre-September 11, 2001 survey data makes before and after 
comparisons impossible.  Some data exists showing Muslim discontent with 
America prior to September 11, but data on support for Osama bin Laden and 
suicide bombings is not available on a regional basis prior to the attacks.  
Without the earlier data it is impossible to analyze the effect September 11 had 
on opinions; however, we can measure overall levels of support in these areas.  
The analysis below assumes that current attitudes are the most relevant in 
impacting al-Qaeda’s decision making process. 
1. Do Unfavorable Ratings Equate to Justified Violence? 
 Following September 11, America was confronted with the realization that 
the United States was, in many regions of the world, widely disliked if not hated.  
Subsequent surveys conducted by Zogby International and the Pew Global 
Attitudes Project examined both the magnitude of dislike and what specific 
aspects of the United States that caused these feelings.  As seen in Tables 1 and 
2, both polls show large majorities in Muslim countries holding unfavorable views 
of the United States. 
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Table 1.   Zogby Poll 2002/2005 U.S. Favorability Ratings (From: James Zogby, 
Attitudes of Arabs 2005 (Washington D.C.: Arab American Institute, 2005). 
 
  
Questions about the reasons for this dislike clearly indicate that they are 
the result of negative perceptions of United States’ policy in the Middle East, not 
a universal loathing of everything American.105  In fact, “Arabs and Muslims 
appeared to like various aspects of American life and culture.”106  This raises an 
important question: would Muslims sanction the killing of civilians whom they 
share at least some values with?  The gap between Muslim dislike of policies and 
the somewhat favorable ratings of other aspects of Americans suggests that 
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Table 2.   Favorable Opinions of the U.S. (From:  America’s Image Slips, But Allies 
Share U.S. Concern over Iran, Hamas, Pew Global Attitudes Project 
(Washington D.C.: Pew Research Center, 2005). 
 
 
 Do these highly unfavorable opinions translate into support for a WMD 
attack against the United States?  If those harboring negative views of the United 
States believe al-Qaeda’s justifications and approve of its methods, one would 
expect to find correspondingly high levels of support for frequent suicide attacks 
against civilians.  While Pew found that unfavorable opinions towards the United 
States did correlate with higher support for terrorism, this has not necessarily 
translated into a high level of support for frequent suicide bombing of civilians.107  
Figures 1 and 2 above show a dismal level of favorable opinions of the United 
States in the Muslim countries.  Yet the Muslim countries sampled in 2006 do not 
show a correspondingly high level of belief that these bombings against civilians 
are “often justified.”108  The following question was posed: 
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Some people think that suicide bombing and other forms of 
violence against civilian targets are justified in order to defend Islam 
from its enemies. Other people believe that, no matter what the 
reason, this kind of violence is never justified. Do you personally 
feel that this kind of violence is often justified to defend Islam, 
sometimes justified, rarely justified, or never justified?109 
 In the 2006 Pew survey, the following percentage of respondents 
answered “often justified”: 110 
 Egypt 8% 
 Nigeria 8% 
 Pakistan 7% 
 Jordan 5% 
 Turkey 3% 
 Indonesia 2% 
If the high level of dislike in Muslim countries translates into support for al-
Qaeda, the number of respondents who see suicide attacks against civilians as 
“often justified” should be high.  This is not the case.  It turns out that Muslim 
publics are very discriminating in what they see as justified violence.  For 
example, support for suicide bombings against both Israelis and Americans and 
Westerners in Iraq are much higher than support for suicide attacks against 
civilians in general.111  The only explanation for this is that Muslims draw clear 
distinctions between legitimate and illegitimate violence.  Even though large 
majorities in Muslim countries dislike the U.S. because of its foreign policies, this 
does not appear to equate with large numbers of people who support the most 
extreme frequency of suicide attacks.   While this is an indirect measure, the 
disparity between high unfavorable ratings of the U.S. and support for suicide 
bombing of civilians indicates that Muslim populations would overwhelmingly not 
support massive, indiscriminate violence against civilians in the United States. 
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2. Support for Osama Bin Laden and Disbelief in 9/11 
Along with the high unfavorable ratings of the U.S., confidence placed in 
Osama bin Laden by Muslims in many countries is alarming.  In one country 
surveyed, Nigeria, a majority of those Muslims polled placed at least some 
confidence in bin Laden; many other countries contained sizeable minorities 
expressing a similar confidence.  
Country 
 
A lot/some  Not too 
much/ 
None 
Turkey 4 79 
Jordan 24 74 
Egypt 26 71 
Indonesia 33 52 
Pakistan 38 30 
Nigerian Muslims 61 33 
 
Table 3.   Confidence in Osama bin Laden (After: Great Divide: How Westerners 
and Muslims View Each Other, Pew Global Attitudes Project (Washington 
D.C.: Pew Research Center, 2006). 
 
 
These numbers appear to defy the analysis in the previous section.  But 
again, the numbers are not as simple as they appear.  First, if these numbers 
represented support for al-Qaeda’s justification for killing civilians, then those 
numbers indicating support for suicide attacks against civilians as “often justified” 
should at least correspond to the numbers showing confidence in bin Laden.  
The fact that sizable minorities in several countries have some confidence in bin 
Laden, without correspondingly high numbers who believe that killing civilians is 
“often justified” begs for alternative explanations. 
The answer could be that in many Muslim countries, a majority of those 
surveyed do not believe that Arabs carried out the September 11 attacks.  If 
some Muslims do not believe that bin Laden was responsible for the September 
11 attacks then they could express confidence in bin Laden as a Muslim icon 








Table 4.   Did Arabs Carry Out 9/11 Attacks? (After: The Great Divide: How 
Westerners and Muslims View Each Other, Pew Global Attitudes Project 
(Washington D.C.: Pew Research Center, 2006). 
 
Interestingly, in every country but Nigeria, the survey showed the percent 
of respondents who have confidence in bin Laden is less than the percentage 




























Figure 1.   Disbelief that Arabs carried out 9/11 vs. confidence in bin Laden (After: 
The Great Divide: How Westerners and Muslims View Each Other, Pew 
Global Attitudes Project (Washington D.C.: Pew Research Center, 2006; 
Great Divide: How Westerners and Muslims View Each Other, Pew Global 
Attitudes Project (Washington D.C.: Pew Research Center, 2006). 
 
Country Yes No Don’t Know/Refused 
Indonesia 16 65 20 
Egypt 32 59 9 
Turkey 16 59 25 
Jordan 39 53 8 
Pakistan 15 41 44 
Nigerian Muslims 42 47 11 
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This opens up a potential explanation.  In the case of the Nigerian Muslim 
community, a small percentage of people believe Arabs carried out the 
September 11 attacks and yet still have confidence in bin Laden.  For the 
remainder of the countries surveyed, it is at least a possibility that those who 
express confidence in bin Laden also constitute a large majority of those who do 
not believe that Arabs committed the attacks (and, by obvious extension, bin 
Laden was not responsible).  The implication is significant: the numbers 
expressing confidence in bin Laden may not necessarily imply acceptance of al-
Qaeda’s tactics.  In fact, this explanation seems more plausible when one 
remembers that very small percentages of Muslims accept that killing civilians is 
frequently justified.  To be sure, this explanation likely explains only part of the 
polling data, but it calls into question any assertion that the Muslim community 
would support mass indiscriminate killing of civilians, as would be experienced in 
a WMD attack. 
The widespread denial of Arab involvement in the September 11 attacks 
has serious implications when examining al-Qaeda’s decision to use WMD.  If 
Muslims are not inclined to hold al-Qaeda accountable, will there be any 
consequences for carrying out an attack?  Likewise, will al-Qaeda believe in its 
ability to mobilize supporters if a majority of Muslims do not think it is capable of 
conducting such an attack?  This survey result introduces a considerable 
unknown variable into the decision making process. 
Muslim opinion matters because al-Qaeda’s strategy relies so heavily on 
gaining support from their coreligionists. Polling data in not comprehensive, the 
questions asked have only indirect bearings on questions of WMD legitimacy, 
and some data appears to contradict itself.  But by carefully examining the 
complexities of response, a few conclusions are evident.  First, the highly 
unfavorable ratings that Muslims give the United States are a major problem 
because al-Qaeda attempts to usurp these feelings to justify its own violence.  
However, the negative feelings towards the United States do not translate into a 
belief that frequently killing civilians in defense of Islam is justified.  If most 
Muslims believe a WMD attack against an American city was justified, those 
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numbers supporting frequent suicide bombings of civilians should be higher.  The 
differences between dislike of the United States, support for killing civilians, and 
support for suicide attacks in Israel and Iraq indicate that Muslims differentiate 
between legitimate and illegitimate violence.  Confidence in Osama bin Laden by 
a significant minority of Muslims may be the by-product of conspiracy theories 
running rampant throughout the Muslim world.  The widespread disbelief in an 
Arab hand in September 11 is a major complication in determining how al-Qaeda 
may gauge the level of support it enjoys, as well as an indicator of the high level 
of distrust Muslims feel towards the United States.  If September 11 is not 
attributed to al-Qaeda, would they feel free to attack the United States without 
significant backlash from Muslim populations, or does al-Qaeda understand that 
the minority expressing confidence in bin Laden does not necessarily mean there 
is sufficient support for a WMD attack against the United States?  The disfavor 
and distrust of the United States allows far too much ambiguity in interpreting 
Muslim sentiments. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Against the background of Islamic tradition, al-Qaeda’s call may resonate 
with Muslims, but its manifestation is regarded as illegitimate.  Al-Qaeda’s 
justification for killings civilians is shaky; it arguments for the use of WMD are 
even weaker.  The jihadi and fundamentalist communities have not reacted 
positively to September 11.  While they share an animosity towards the West 
with al-Qaeda and a majority of Muslims, they regard al-Qaeda’s attacks as 
violating Islamic law.  Maintaining a discriminating stance on what constitutes 
legitimate violence is important to the credibility of these groups; al-Qaeda 
erodes this legitimacy.  The fear of Western retribution is a significant factor in 
jihadi and fundamentalist rejection of al-Qaeda; they are seen as recklessly 
endangering these movements.  Clearly al-Qaeda cannot expect that these 
groups would support a WMD attack against America. 
The analysis of Muslim opinion in general is less optimistic.  While 
widespread dislike of the United States in the Muslim world may not translate into 
support for a WMD attack, al-Qaeda may not come to the same conclusion.  The 
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majorities shown to disbelieve that Arabs carried out September 11 may be 
allowing a significant minority of people to still express confidence in Osama bin 
Laden, even if they would not sanction al-Qaeda’s tactics.  Al-Qaeda may see 
the confidence expressed in bin Laden as an encouragement of their tactics, not 
understanding that the foundation of these feelings is not an endorsement for 
killings Western civilians, but an enormous lack of trust in the West.  The 
negative sentiments that the U.S. has accrued allow too much ambiguity in 
determining if Muslims would support a WMD attack against America.  A careful 
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IV. AL-QAEDA REACTS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 Al-Qaeda cares very much about the sentiments of Muslims, but the 
reaction of this constituency has been anything but positive.  While al-Qaeda 
shares a hatred for the West with many in the Muslim world, their violence has 
been largely rejected.  The fundamentalist and jihadi communities have turned 
against their tactics.  The greater Muslim public does not endorse the 
indiscriminate killing of civilians.  These two together – al-Qaeda’s appeal for 
constituent support and the constituencies’ refusal to sanction indiscriminate 
violence against civilians indicate that al-Qaeda would limit its attacks to avoid 
negative reaction.  Is there any evidence that al-Qaeda will take these sentiments 
into account? 
 The desire for constituent approval and a corresponding lack of this 
approval are necessary but not sufficient conditions to constrain violence.  Al-
Qaeda will not be constrained unless it also shows an awareness of this 
constituent disapproval and a willingness to change its tactics as a result.  This 
chapter will examine the extent to which al-Qaeda is pragmatic in its search for 
support; demonstrate that al-Qaeda is aware of negative sentiments within the 
Muslim world; and how their pragmatism has manifested itself by constraining 
violence.  This will demonstrate that there are sufficient conditions for al-Qaeda 
to be constrained in the type of violence it feels is productive.  This has clear 
implications on al-Qaeda’s decision to use WMD; if they are constrained from 
employing certain attacks against civilians, there is a strong argument that the 
use of WMD may be similarly limited. 
 This chapter will also examine evidence that some claim indicates al-
Qaeda has already made the decision to use WMD.  Statements by al-Qaeda 
their reported interest in and attempts to acquire WMD are commonly cited as 
proof that they will not hesitate to use these weapons.  A careful examination of 
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this evidence will show that al-Qaeda’s efforts in this regard do not  
necessarily indicate a predisposition towards WMD use. 
B. THE MANAGEMENT OF VIOLENCE 
1. Pragmatism 
Demonstrating that al-Qaeda seeks a constituency and that this 
constituency may not support a WMD attack does not necessarily mean al-
Qaeda will constrain itself.  Al-Qaeda will not be constrained by Muslim sentiment 
unless it demonstrates a willingness to modify the means it uses to achieve its 
ends.  Is al-Qaeda willing to change its tactics to gain the ummah’s support?  
Chapter II noted that this is behind al-Qaeda’s decision to shift from targeting 
apostate governments in the Middle East to the United States - Zawahiri believed 
the attacks would rally the ummah.112  This indicates that al-Qaeda does indeed 
change its strategy based upon anticipation of positive Muslim reaction.  Could 
pragmatism also function to constrain al-Qaeda’s violence if it was having 
negative effects?   
The need to tailor violence in order to achieve intended effects is not a 
new concept.  All terrorist groups seeking popular support “execute a controlled 
use of violence as a means to achieving their specific political ends.  Doing too 
much can be just as damaging to the cause as doing too little.”113  Faced with 
this dilemma, groups have two choices.  They can choose to ignore negative 
sentiments being created by their attacks in favor of ideological purity, or they 
can adopt a degree of pragmatism.  Al Qaeda is not immune to this dilemma, and 
the evidence suggests that for the time being they have chosen pragmatism over 
ideology.114 
Naji and Zawahiri devote considerable thought to these issues.   Both 
explicitly state the need to manage violence in order to gain and maintain public 
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support.  Naji recognizes that “the Muslim public is particularly troubled…by the 
jihadis excessive use of violence, particularly against other Muslims.”115  He also 
…worries that low ranking members of the movement will initiate 
their own large scale attacks against high-value targets.  Medium 
and small attacks are fine…but launching another 9/11-type attack 
or targeting certain classes of people is a decision best left to the 
High Command – targeting the wrong people at the wrong time 
would turn the masses against the movement.116   
 Zawahiri’s letter to Zarqawi clearly indicates that Zawahiri understands the 
need for pragmatism if al-Qaeda is to gain support.  Zawahiri counsels Zarqawi, 
“You well know that purity of faith and the correct way of living are not connected 
necessarily to success in the field unless you take into consideration the reasons 
and practices which events are guided by.”117  Zawahiri places the full 
responsibility for convincing the masses on the jihadis themselves, rather than 
blaming the ummah for not understanding al-Qaeda’s violence.  This distinction 
cannot be over-emphasized, because it implicitly acknowledges that jihadis 
realize they do not have the freedom to execute violence without careful 
consideration of how the ummah will receive it.  Gilles Kepel notes that although 
Zawahiri holds a lowly view of the masses, he says “we must not blame the 
umma for not reacting or not being up to the task.  We are to blame for not 
having been able to get our message across, not having been able to convey our 
compassion and the sacrifices we have made.”118  In essence, Zawahiri is saying 
the customer is always right when it comes to accepting or rejecting violence.  It 
is up to the elite jihadis to tailor their violence and propaganda to gain support 
from the Muslim masses.  Al-Qaeda’s number two man makes their choice clear: 
pragmatism is a necessary component of their strategy. 
 Zawahiri’s concerns are repeated in the letter from ‘Atiyah to Zarqawi.  He 
counsels Zarqawi that “policy must be dominant over militarism…That is to say, 
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that military action is servant to policy.”119  ‘Atiyah draws on his experience in 
Algeria, where militants descended into slaughter and lost the support of the 
people.  He says, “What use is it for us to delight in some operations and 
successful strikes when the immediate repercussion is a defeat for us of our call, 
and a loss of the justice of our cause and its logic in the minds of the masses 
who make up the people of the Muslim nation….”  He also urges Zarqawi to 
“abstain from making any decision on a comprehensive issue (one with a broad 
reach), and on substantial matters until you have turned to your leadership; 
Shaykh Usamah and the Doctor, and their brothers their, and consult with 
them.”120  An example of such an issue is “expanding the arena of the war to 
neighboring countries, and also undertaking some large-scale operations whose 
impact is great and whose influence is pervasive, and things of that nature.” 121 
 Pragmatism governs al-Qaeda’s violence.  Unless they are seen as 
“fighting a just war and walking the moral high ground,” jihadis will not receive the 
public support necessary to be a serious strategic threat to both Western and 
Middle Eastern governments.122  By their own admission the leaders and 
ideologues of violent jihadism are governed in both their words and deeds by the 
constituency they hope to mobilize. 
2. Recognition of Norms 
If pragmatism is to have any effect on the level and type of violence al-
Qaeda perpetrates, they must be aware that some of what they’re doing is 
having negative consequences. 
There is evidence suggesting that al-Qaeda is aware that their violence is 
not being accepted well in the Muslim world.  Simon and Martini write, “Recent 
messages attributed to Al Qaeda suggest a consensus growing within the Muslim 
world against the targeting of noncombatants.”123  The repeated justifications 
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al-Qaeda makes demonstrate knowledge that their behavior violates Islamic 
norms. Simon and Martini note that norms can be recognized indirectly by “ex 
post facto justifications.”124  The literature states, “Norms prompt justifications for 
action and leave an extensive trail of communication among actors.”125  If this is 
true, al-Qaeda has left a long trail of justifications that illustrate their tacit 
acknowledgement of norm violation.  Simon and Martini conclude that al-Qaeda’s 
“determined efforts to revise the nature of targets are not insignificant; the 
attackers’ evident compulsion to redefine the identity of those killed indicates fear 
over the implication of killing civilians.”126 
In the wake of September 11, al-Qaeda’s behavior indicates they were 
aware the attacks were having an adverse effect on their constituency.  Bin 
Laden did not take immediate credit for what are the most spectacular terrorist 
attacks of all time.  Instead, bin Laden attempted to justify the attacks first as a 
reprisal for Muslim deaths.  He then attempted to characterize the targets as 
“icons of military and economic power” instead of civilian targets.127  He 
continued to offer new arguments.  Gilles Kepel noted: 
As if the weaknesses of his argument were visible even to himself, 
Bin Laden followed a different line of thinking in his next 
explanation; “The American people should remember that they pay 
taxes to their government, they elect their president, their 
government manufactures arms and gives them to Israel, and Israel 
uses them to massacre Palestinians.  The American Congress 
endorses all government measures and this proves that [all] 
America is responsible for the atrocities perpetrated against 
Muslims.  [All] America, because they elect the Congress.”128 
The timing of bin Laden’s first admission of responsibility for September 
11 is significant: it coincided with the highly publicized Israeli incursion into the 
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Jenin refugee camp, where a large number of civilian casualties occurred.129  Bin 
Laden had waited more than seven months to claim responsibility in the hope 
that Muslim revulsion over September 11 would be lost in its anger at Israel and 
the West over Jenin. 
Since September 11 public opinion has forced al-Qaeda to defend itself 
after attacks in Casablanca, Riyadh, and Istanbul.130  Even Zarqawi, notorious 
for his brutality in Iraq, appears to be influenced by these social norms: “The 
unwillingness of Zarqawi’s group to claim credit for unpopular attacks also 
indicates a growing sensitivity to public opinion commensurate with a drop in 
support among Sunnis.”131  Simon and Martini concluded that, “In short, Al 
Qaeda’s statements suggest that disregard for the sanctity of noncombatants is 
no longer without political cost among their constituencies.”132   
3. Evidence of Constraint  
The most concrete evidence that al-Qaeda is constrained in carried out 
indiscriminate violence is Zawahiri’s rebuke to Zarqawi about the videotaped 
beheadings of Western hostages in Iraq.  Zawahiri makes clear his feelings on 
the matter: 
Among the things which the feelings of the Muslim populace who 
love and support you will never find palatable - also- are the scenes 
of slaughtering the hostages. You shouldn't be deceived by the 
praise of some of the zealous young men and their description of 
you as the shaykh of the slaughterers, etc. They do not express the 
general view of the admirer and the supporter of the resistance in 
Iraq, and of you in particular by the favor and blessing of God.133 
 
The author recognizes that even though Zarqawi may have a group of 
supporters that applaud his violence, they are not representative of the general 
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population that sees these actions as unacceptable.  Zawahiri also explains how 
he views these executions in relation to American attacks: though he judges 
them to be no worse than what America has done, they are still not permissible: 
And your response, while true, might be: Why shouldn't we sow 
terror in the hearts of the Crusaders and their helpers? And isn't the 
destruction of the villages and the cities on the heads of their 
inhabitants more cruel than slaughtering? And aren't the cluster 
bombs and the seven ton bombs and the depleted uranium bombs 
crueler than slaughtering? And isn't killing by torture crueler than 
slaughtering? And isn't violating the honor of men and women more 
painful and more destructive than slaughtering? 
All of these questions and more might be asked, and you are 
justified. However this does not change the reality at all, which is 
that the general opinion of our supporters does not comprehend 
that, and that this general opinion falls under a campaign by the 
malicious, perfidious, and fallacious campaign by the deceptive and 
fabricated media. And we would spare the people from the effect of 
questions about the usefulness of our actions in the hearts and 
minds of the general opinion that is essentially sympathetic to 
us.134 
Zawahiri displays an excellent understanding that producing such scenes 
robs jihadis of sympathy and support from the Muslim population.  His judgment 
is that it is better to restrict violence in order to build support rather than satisfy 
Zarqawi’s bloodlust.  Ending his reprimand, Zawahiri closes, “We don’t need 
this.”135  Atiyah’s letter confirms and echoes many of the themes in Zawahiri’s 
letter.  He says, “It is a genuine letter and it represents the thoughts of the 
brothers, the shaykhs, and all of the intellectual and moral leadership here.”136 
Zawahiri’s efforts to end the videotaped slaughter of Westerners in Iraq 
are absolutely crucial in establishing the full measure of constraint that al-Qaeda 
operates under.  It is one thing to limit violence towards their co-religionists.  By 
acknowledging that gruesome attacks on Westerners erodes the support of 
Muslims, Zawahiri implicitly admits that there are limits to what al-Qaeda can do 
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to Westerners while retaining any hope of support.  He feels that beheadings are 
not equivalent to what the West has done to Muslims, yet still he is obliged to put 
an end to them.  If Zawahiri believes he cannot allow this type of violence, would 
he allow the use of WMD against civilians?  Zawahiri’s current assessment of 
Muslim sentiment indicates that he feels that al-Qaeda must be very careful 
about the types of violence it carries out. 
C. EVIDENCE OF INTENT TO USE WMD 
Based on the statements of Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda’s reported 
attempts to acquire WMD, many would argue that the decision to use WMD has 
already been made, regardless of constituent sentiment.  A careful look reveals 
this assertion to be overstated at best.  In addition to the 2003 fatwa issued by 
Sheikh al-Fahd authorizing (not directing) use of WMD, two statements are cited 
as evidence of intent.  In a 1999 ABC news interview, bin Laden said: 
To seek to possess the weapons that could counter those of the 
infidels is a religious duty.  If I have indeed acquired these 
weapons, then this is an obligation I carried out and I thank God for 
enabling us to do that.  And if I seek to acquire these weapons I am 
carrying out a duty.  It would be a sin for Muslims not to try to 
possess the weapons that would prevent the infidels from inflicting 
harm on Muslims.  But how we could use these weapons if we 
possess them is up to us.137   
Bin Laden added to his thoughts on WMD in a newspaper interview 
shortly after September 11, stating, “I want to make it clear that if the United 
States uses chemical or nuclear weapons against us, we will not perish.”138  
These statements, taken with al-Qaeda’s reported efforts to acquire WMD 
capability, have been conflated with the intent to use WMD.  No where does bin 
Laden state in an unqualified manner that he intends to use WMD against the 
West; his statements rely on possessing WMD as a deterrent.  Gerges shows  
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that the decision to use WMD is anything but complete; even the hawks within al-
Qaeda sought WMD as a deterrent, not a weapon whose employment would 
achieve their goals:  
The hawks argued that obtaining WMD would serve as a deterrent 
to America’s overwhelming power, a balancing act in the military 
struggle against the United States; in contrast, the doves advocated 
placing limits on how jihadis wage the struggle and confining local 
conflicts to their geographical borders and settings.  The doves, 
Abu al-Walid writes, opposed the expansion of the struggle lest 
jihadis lose international sympathy and invite brutal military 
retaliation; as to WMD, the doves warned that jihadis were in no 
position to match the destructive power of the U.S. nuclear 
armada.139 
Gerges goes on to reveal that the debate was “theoretical because…Al 
Qaeda did not posses the means, materials, capability, or know-how.”140  In fact, 
bin Laden’s statements were for propaganda.  He “publicly boasted about al 
Qaeda’s WMD potential and made it seem that the organization was on the 
verge of a breakthrough.”141  The senior al Qaeda member that Gerges cites 
claims bin Laden talked about WMD for propaganda purposes, not because he 
had and intended to use the weapons.142  Though al Qaeda publicly threatens 
the use of WMD, the evidence shows that the statements were more propaganda 
than substance. 
Adam Dolnik agrees with the idea that bin Laden’s statements are 
designed for their propaganda effects: 
Even though bin Laden does not strive for political power, he does 
have a constituency.  The use of WMD would generate bad press 
even in the Muslim world and bin Laden knows this.  His 
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with this explanation.  On one hand he likes the idea of generating 
fear among the American public while on the other hand he tries to 
avoid bad press.143 
 What about al-Qaeda’s attempts to acquire WMD capabilities?  Al-
Qaeda’s efforts to acquire this capability reportedly go back to the early 1990s.  
They include: 
 Efforts to obtain fissile material from Europe and South Africa for 
construction of a nuclear weapon 
 Attempts to purchase nuclear warheads from Kazakhstan, Russia, 
Turkmenistan, and the Ukraine 
 Allegations that bin Laden successfully obtained “suitcase bombs” 
through Chechnya 
 Purchase of anthrax from an East Asian country 
 Purchase of botulism toxin from a lab in the Czech Republic 
 Development of unspecified chemical weapons capabilities144 
 
The uncritical assertion that al-Qaeda’s attempts to acquire WMD equal 
intent to use misses the mark: they are not the same.  This interpretation makes 
sense in view of bin Laden’s statements that WMDs are to be used as a 
deterrent.  There are no promises to use the weapons once they are acquired; in 
fact, bin Laden is rather coy when discussing any capability al-Qaeda might 
have. 
If al-Qaeda has a WMD capability as many authorities claim, why have 
they not used it?  Conversely, if they intend to use WMD, why have they not 
achieved at least a demonstrative capability given their substantial pre-
September 11 resources?  The rudimentary attempts to gain WMD capability 
should not be taken as intent by al Qaeda leadership to plan and execute a bona 
fide large scale WMD attack.  If anything, the failure of al-Qaeda to use WMD is 
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an indicator that constituency constraint is occurring; if al-Qaeda felt they could 
conduct a WMD attack without negative repercussions in the Muslim world, their 
attempts should have resulted in some kind of demonstrated capability.  This 
distinction may not be comforting; al-Qaeda’s possession of WMD for any 
reason, including deterrence, could have dire consequences.  But the distinction 
between propaganda, attempts at acquisition, and intent to use WMD are 
important: they are not the same.  Even bin Laden’s rhetoric avoids expressing 
any unqualified intent to use WMD because he fears constituent response. 
D. CONCLUSION 
This chapter provides the final piece of evidence supporting the claim that 
al-Qaeda is subject to constituency constraint.  The previous two chapters 
provided the necessary conditions.  First, al-Qaeda’s strategy is dependent upon 
gaining support of the ummah.  Second, this support is in serious doubt.  While 
Muslims may share al-Qaeda’s hatred of the United States, the majority of 
jihadis, fundamentalist, and Muslims in general do not support the indiscriminate 
killing of civilians.   
Al-Qaeda has shown itself to be aware of this negative sentiment, willing 
to be pragmatic to achieve their goals, and have attempted to restrain violence 
against Western civilians because of these negative reactions.  It has also been 
demonstrated that al-Qaeda’s rhetoric about and attempted acquisition of WMD 
capability is not the same as the intent to use these weapons.  In fact, the 
evidence examined in this case reinforces the view that al-Qaeda has not made 
the decision to employ WMD. 
Does the constraint demonstrated in this chapter translate into constraints 
on WMD use?  If the constraint shown in this chapter is logically extended, the 


























Suggesting that al-Qaeda would consciously choose not to use WMD 
against America is a contrarian thought.  The popular depiction of al-Qaeda is 
that of an apocalyptic group of Islamic zealots bent on destroying Americans and 
their way of life.  Al-Qaeda’s statements about WMD and reported attempts to 
acquire this capability amplify this feeling to the extent that most politicians and 
many academics accept this characterization without question.  This generalized 
notion of al-Qaeda leads to an unstudied assumption that al-Qaeda, aside from 
technical hurdles, is free of any constrains on using WMD in the United States.  
This assumption ignores evidence indicating traditional constituent constraints on 
violence are present. 
This chapter will summarize the findings from chapter II-V, place these 
within al-Qaeda’s larger strategic decision making framework, and identify 
associated policy implications. 
B. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
1. Al-Qaeda’s Search for Public Support 
Al-Qaeda actively seeks the support of a Muslim constituency, without 
which jihadis do not believe they can succeed.  Gaining popular support is the 
central theme to al-Qaeda’s strategy, which it hopes will offset their relative 
military weakness.  This strategy is based on a study of past failures – Algeria, 
Egypt, and Syria – where militant jihadis were crushed by “apostate” 
governments because jihadis lost or never gained support of the local population.  
This intellectual basis of the quest for popular support is important in two 
respects.  First, it is rooted in an empirical examination by jihadis themselves, 
rather than an experimental theory that may simply be discarded when they see 
fit.  Second, it offers no other path to success other than through popular support.  
In order for jihadis to turn away from this strategy a substantial revision of their 
underlying intellectual thought must take place.  Al-Qaeda is ideologically locked 
into the attempt to gain public support.  This analysis is based upon the most 
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contemporary jihadi strategy documents, as well as communications directly from 
the senior most al-Qaeda leadership.  Based on this examination, al-Qaeda is 
likely to actively seek the support of a Muslim constituency for the foreseeable 
future. 
2. Rejection of Al-Qaeda’s Violence 
The high level of anger towards the United States is worrisome, and 
Muslims may identify with al-Qaeda’s grievances.  However, this does not 
necessarily mean that a majority of Muslims endorse indiscriminate violence 
against civilians.  Al-Qaeda’s justifications run counter to Islamic tradition, and its 
violence transgresses traditional conceptions of defensive jihad.  Jihadi and 
fundamentalist groups, al-Qaeda’s most likely allies in Western eyes, have 
rejected al-Qaeda’s legitimacy and fear that massive violence against the West 
will allow governments to crush all fundamentalist movements seen as a threat, 
not just al-Qaeda.  Simply put, al-Qaeda does not enjoy the support of the 
majority of fundamentalist organizations. 
Likewise, Muslims in general have not granted al-Qaeda the support it 
desires, but this fact seems lost on many Westerners.  Instead of hearing 
expressions of disproval of extremist violence from the Muslim world, the West 
concentrates on the accompanying criticism of United States’ foreign policy.  It is 
difficult for the West to get beyond accusations placing the blame for September 
11 and jihadi violence on the United States.  The West has not looked past what 
the media depicts.  Amaney Jamal, an assistant professor and Muslim public 
opinion specialist at Princeton University, explains the problem in an interview 
with Pew’s Mark O’Keefe: 
Look at the last year of news coverage coming out of the Middle 
East.  Who has been covered in the Western media?  Hamas 
spokespeople, the Iranian president; Osama bin Laden, Ayman al 
Zawahiri and that little video of Abu Musab al Zarqawi when he was 
killed.  What other speakers or images from the Muslim world have 
we seen?  Have we seen intellectuals?  Have we seen 
researchers?  Have we seen thinkers?  Have we seen ordinary 
people on the street?  As you point out, and as the data point out, 
support for bin Laden is falling in the Muslim world.  Yet it is almost 
as if the Western media has still “elected” him as an evil icon.  In 
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the Arab Muslim world, where we tend to see the highest levels of 
anti-Westernism, bin Laden has never really enjoyed solid support.  
Yet he has become an icon to the West, and that is a great 
concern.  It affects and angers Muslims, and it also frightens 
Westerners.  It reifies the divisions.145 
Even Pew and Zogby, perhaps the most well regarded international polling 
institutions, fail to ask questions that examine important distinctions in Muslim 
opinion.  The analysis of this data in chapter III reveals some important 
discrepancies in conventional wisdom.  First, the high levels of dislike for the 
United States do not necessarily translate into widespread acceptance of 
frequent suicide attacks against civilians.  A logical conclusion to this finding is 
that the majority of Muslims would not support a WMD attack against the United 
States; the corresponding loss of support would be a critical blow to al-Qaeda.  
Second, though bin Laden enjoys the confidence from a sizeable minority, this 
may be based more on disbelief in Arab involvement in September 11 and 
generalized anger at the West rather than an endorsement of bin Laden’s 
methods.  Neither of these two findings should bring much comfort to the United 
States, but they paint a more detailed picture of Muslim opinion: there is not 
widespread support for indiscriminate killing.  Gilles Kepel agrees: 
Beyond the circle of Bin Laden and Zawahiri and their supporters 
and admirers, however, the majority of Islamists and salafists, let 
alone most of the world’s Muslims, no longer see the commando 
action carried out by the “umma’s blessed vanguard” against the 
twin towers and the Pentagon as fulfilling the promise of jihad.  On 
the contrary, after the first few seconds of enthusiasm for this blow 
to America’s “arrogance,” most Muslims saw the massacre of 
innocents on September 11 as opening the door to disorder and 
devastation within the house of Islam.146 
 
3. Violence Constrained 
Terrorists will not be constrained, even if they do seek approval of a 
constituency, if they do not believe in conducting violence in a pragmatic manner.  
                                            
145 Amaney Jamal, interviewed by Mark O’Keefe, “Islam and the West: How Great a Divide,”  
Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, July 10, 2006.  
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Al-Qaeda strategists have been very clear in this regard: pragmatism is required 
to gain the support of the Muslim masses.  Al-Qaeda is very concerned that their 
violence does not turn away potential supporters, and they are willing to 
constrain their actions to this end.  This train of thought is evident in jihadi 
strategic writings and the recent al-Qaeda correspondence to Zarqawi.  They 
view violence as meaningless on a strategic level unless it brings them closer to 
their goals.  To this end, evidence suggests that al-Qaeda is growing more aware 
that their indiscriminate targeting of civilians is not being tolerated by the majority 
of Muslims.  This awareness has translated into attempts by senior al-Qaeda 
leaders to reign in Zarqawi.  They view Zarqawi’s savage attacks as 
counterproductive to the effort to win public support, and thus counterproductive 
to achieving their objectives.  Would the horrors surrounding a WMD attack be 
any more palatable to the masses?  A large scale WMD attack on a United 
States city would be inconsistent with al-Qaeda’s strategy and counterproductive 
in building Muslim support. 
C. CONSTITUENT CONSTRAINT IN THE BIGGER PICTURE 
To be sure, the effect of a particular act of terrorism on a constituency is 
not the only factor in deciding to commit violence.  Martha Crenshaw identified 
many other costs and benefits that groups consider before resorting to 
terrorism.147  Since al-Qaeda has shown itself to be pragmatic and desires to 
control violence to achieve its ends, it could be expected to engage in reasonably 
rational decision making that takes into account these costs and benefits.  If al-
Qaeda considered conducting a large scale WMD attack within the United 
States, would there be sufficient benefits to offset the costs?  In light of the 
unique status of a WMD attack and al-Qaeda’s emphasis on winning popular 
support, even the traditional benefits of terrorism would likely be lost:   
 Agenda settings: Al-Qaeda had already successfully accomplished 
this function with September 11.  With world attention now focused 
on the United States’ debacle in Iraq, and the growing Taliban 
insurgency in Afghanistan, a WMD attack would merely refocus 
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Choice,” in Terrorism and Counterterrorism, ed. Russell Howard and Reid Sawyer (Connecticut: 
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world attention on the importance of eradicating militant jihadis – a 
situation decidedly disadvantageous to the current one. 
 Undermining the government and demoralizing population:  The 
wholesale destruction of an entire American city would not cripple 
the U.S. government’s ability to respond.  U.S. power is simply too 
widespread to be crippled in any single attack.  The U.S. population 
may be shocked that such an attack could occur, but politicians 
have been warning of the possibility for years.  It is more likely that 
the response would resemble that after the September 11 attacks, 
when the country drew together in the face of its modern Pearl 
Harbor. Such an attack would also reinvigorate the American public 
which has grown tired of the Iraq war. 
 Inspiring resistance by example: Catastrophic WMD use within the 
United States does not satisfy commonly held conceptions of a 
defensive jihad.   The September 11 attacks did not cause Muslim 
populations to rise up - it is more likely Muslims would recoil at such 
an attack.  However, al-Qaeda would benefit from demonstrating 
the capability to conduct such an attack. 
 Provoking repression:  A WMD attack would certainly provoke the 
United States into sweeping military action; but in the face of such 
an attack, this action would come with a heaping dose of 
legitimacy.  In fact, such an attack would be decidedly counter-
productive in this respect: it would restore the sympathy and 
legitimacy granted to the United States post-September 11 but has 
since squandered. 
Aside from proving their ability to do so, al-Qaeda would not accrue many 
benefits from such an attack.  A common theme in this evaluation is that the 
current domestic and international political situation is more favorable now than 
could be expected after a WMD attack.  The war weariness of the American 
public and the United States’ low political standing are to al-Qaeda’s advantage; 
a WMD attack stands a good chance of reversing this situation.  In addition to 
these negligible benefits, a WMD attack would also impose serious costs: 
 Government retribution: The government reaction to a WMD attack 
would be massive, not only by the United States, but governments 
worldwide.  The United States would be able to mobilize domestic 
and international opinion for massive action against any groups 
associated with militant jihadists.  Once a terrorist group crosses 
the WMD threshold in a catastrophic manner, America would enjoy 
an even greater freedom of action granted it after the September 11 
attacks. 
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 Loss of popular support:  Fellow jihadi and fundamentalist groups 
have already turned against al-Qaeda.  In the aftermath of a WMD 
attack, these same groups would either turn further away or be 
crushed by the international response.  The Muslim masses, who 
largely do not sanction indiscriminate killing, would either condemn 
al-Qaeda or continue to believe in conspiracy theories.  Based on 
reaction to the September 11 attacks, there is no reason to expect 
a WMD attack would prompt a general Muslim uprising. 
From a cost and benefit standpoint a WMD attack would produce negative 
results.  Al-Qaeda cannot count on either fundamentalist or Muslims in general to 
rise up because the majority do not sanction indiscriminate violence.   
Could al-Qaeda miscalculate Muslim response to a WMD attack?  
September 11 was the result of al-Qaeda’s failure to understand “not just 
America’s military response…but also the mood and response of the ummah.  
The ummah may empathize with Al Qaeda’s grievances against the international 
order, particularly Western powers, but it is unwilling to go to war to rectify 
injustice.”148  Al-Qaeda miscalculated reaction to September 11; they cannot 
ignore that “the uprising of the faithful that was expected to seize power and 
reverse the decline of Islamist political movements in the 1990s did not 
materialize.”149  Prior to September 11, al-Qaeda expected Muslim anger 
towards the West to translate into overwhelming support for their attack on 
America; it did not occur.  Crenshaw states that “organizations learn from their 
mistakes and from those of others…Future choices are modified by the 
consequences of present actions.”150  There is no basis for al-Qaeda to believe a 
WMD attack would result in a general Muslim uprising or outpouring of support.  
Al-Qaeda could expect a further turning away by the Muslim masses and a 
further marginalization in the fundamentalist world. 
Returning to the hypothesis, is al-Qaeda is constrained from using WMD 
because they fear losing popular support?  Currently, the weight of evidence 
supports this hypothesis, but it is far from an assured outcome.   As long as 
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United States’ foreign policy continues to create widespread animosity in the 
Muslim world, the possibility exists that al-Qaeda will choose to harness it for its 
own purposes. 
D. PUBLIC OPINION AND POLICY 
Does Muslim public opinion matter?  If the United States is genuinely 
worried about al-Qaeda attacking with WMD, then the answer must be yes.  
Muslim public opinion plays a central role in constraining al-Qaeda’s violence.  
This thesis assesses current Muslim sentiments as sufficient to constrain al-
Qaeda from conducting a WMD attack, but there are no future guarantees.  
Unfortunately, not only does America face an uphill battle in turning around 
Muslim opinion, it must first acknowledge that it matters at all: 
Historically, the opinions and views of non-elites living in Muslim 
countries has been of minimal concern to U.S. policymakers.  
Because of the autocratic nature of many Muslim governments 
(most are either traditional monarchies or single-party states) and 
the lack of democratic institutions, many U.S. policymakers and 
Middle East strategists have dismissed mass opinion as 
unimportant.…151 
 In light of the environment that negative public opinion creates, this 
attitude should be discarded.  As long as the U.S continues to accrue 
tremendous ill-will among Muslims, there will be space for violent jihadis to 
operate in.  As Telhami details below, Muslim anger is the only reason al-Qaeda 
appears to enjoy some support: 
I think a lot of people have misunderstood this rise of frustration 
with the United States as being an endorsement of al-Qaeda’s 
agenda in the region.  They have used all of these seeming trends 
– the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Hamas in the 
Palestinian areas, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and so forth – as 
examples of this rising tide that endorses a pan-Islamic agenda.  
The evidence is not there.  On the contrary, al-Qaeda has not been 
able to win hearts and minds.  Most people have not endorsed its 
agenda.  In fact, when asked what aspect of al-Qaeda do you 
sympathize with most, only 6 percent say they sympathize with 
their advocacy of a puritanical Islamic state.  Only 7 percent say                                             
151 Erik C. Nisbet, Matthew C. Nisbet, Dietram A. Scheufele, and James E. Shanahan, 
“Public Diplomacy, Television News, and Muslim Opinion,” Harvard Journal of Press and Politics 
9, no 2 (Spring 2004): 13. 
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they sympathize with their methods.  A plurality say they like the 
fact that they are standing up to the United States.  This is a 
negative, not a positive.  If you look at these other Islamic groups 
and also at the positions of the public on social issues, you find that 
they are rejecting the agenda advocated by al-Qaeda, but they win 
by default because of anger toward the United States.152 
 More dangerous than this shared anger is the possibility that Muslim 
disapproval for indiscriminate attacks against civilians will erode.  Just as 
prohibitions against killing civilians has eroded in the case of attacks against 
Israelis, the longer this negative sentiment remains, the more likely it is that 
Muslims will accept al-Qaeda’s justifications and acquiesce to the slaughter of 
innocents.153 
 It is in the United States’ national interest to use all possible methods to 
reduce the risk of a WMD attack.  Reducing terrorism and the WMD threat 
remain key components in the 2006 National Security Strategy, yet the impact of 
negative Muslim opinion on America’s security is ignored.  The strategy avoids 
the hard realities of the Middle East: that as long as Muslim publics remain 
enraged by American foreign policy, terrorists enjoy a physical and ideological 
operating environment.  Instead of facing the reality of policy failure, the strategy 
suggests more of the same:  
In the short run, the fight involves using military force and other 
instruments of national power to kill or capture the terrorists, deny 
them safe haven or control of any nation; prevent them from 
gaining access to WMD; and cut off their sources of support.  In the 
long run, winning the war on terror means winning the battle of 
ideas, for it is ideas that can turn the disenchanted into murderers 
willing to kill innocent victims.154   
 Unless the roots of Muslim anger are addressed, the short term strategy 
cannot hope to deny terrorist a sense of support from a population that shares its 
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hatred of the West.  In the long term, the strategy hopes to supplant extremism 
with democracy – a proposition that has proven to be problematic at best.155  
Thus the short term strategy that ignores reality is apt to become strategy in 
perpetuity. 
 Ignoring Muslim public sentiment does not serve the objective of reducing 
terrorist attacks in general, and WMD attacks in particular.  If the United States is 
unwilling to use all the tools available to reduce the risk, it must ask itself just how 
serious it is about preventing a WMD attack.  In so far as reducing Muslim anger 
is inseparable from changes to U.S. foreign policy, does the United States find 
such benefit with current Middle East policies that it is willing to endure the risks 
of an enraged Muslim population?   
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